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2Economic Commentary, September 2018
After a sustained period of weak growth and 
despite ongoing political uncertainty, the Scottish 
economy has been showing some signs of 
strengthening. 
This trend has continued over the summer. 
As we discussed in our last commentary, in recent 
months we have seen evidence of a short-term 
pick-up in the rate of economic growth in Scotland. 
Growth over the year to June 2018  whilst still 
below average  was the fastest since late 2014/
early 2015 and the Scottish economy has outpaced 
the UK for the last two quarters.  
While we remain cautiously optimistic, growth is 
likely to remain below trend for the duration of our 
forecast horizon. 
And overall, the immediate outlook for Scotlands 
economy remains highly uncertain. 
On the one hand, wages across the UK have started 
to pick-up, whilst the global economy remains in 
strong health which should boost Scottish exports. 
Tourism numbers continue to go from strength to 
strength. And the majority of measures of business 
confidence we track have been on the rise, albeit 
from very low levels. 
On the other hand, despite being less than six 
months from the UK leaving the EU, the lack of 
clarity on the UKs future relationship with its 
largest external market continues to cast a shadow 
over the outlook. 
As a result, whilst we are forecasting  in our base 
case  growth of 1.3% this year and 1.4% in 2019 
and 2020, we would stress the heightened degree 
of uncertainty around such point estimates at the 
current time. 
Summary
Our forecasts are based upon a broad-based 
agreement between the UK and the EU. Should this 
not happen, then our forecasts are likely to change 
significantly. With so many different factors  both 
economic and political  about what a no-deal 
may look like, we have not forecast this scenario at 
this stage. An update will be provided in December 
when more details are known. 
As we have argued before, in our view, a 
hard-Brexit would act as a significant drag on 
Scotlands  and the UKs  economic potential. 
Many of the impacts, such as weakened supply 
chains, reduced flow of skilled workers, trade 
barriers, and lower levels of international 
investment will set in gradually. 
However, it is the risk of a no-deal scenario that 
is of most concern in the immediate term. Whether 
you agree or disagree with the decision to leave 
the EU  or the final agreement the UK should 
negotiate with the EU  the need for an orderly 
transition is vital. 
As both the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the 
Governor of the Bank of England have agreed, a 
no-deal outcome would cause hardship for many 
firms, workers and families across the UK. 
Sleepwalking into a no-deal outcome cannot be 
viewed as an effective economic plan. 
Now is the time for effective and strong leadership 
from all our political leaders.
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At a glance
2018 2019 2020
GDP 1.3% 1.4% 1.4%
Production 1.5% 1.6% 1.5%
Construction 1.0% 1.1% 1.0%
Services 1.2% 1.4% 1.3%
Table: FAI forecast Scottish economic growth (%), 2018  2020
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Chart: FAI forecast Scottish economic growth range
Employment (16-64) Unemployment (16+)
Rate (%)
Year 
Change
Rate (%)
Year 
Change
Scotland 75.1% ź 4.1% Ÿ
England 75.8% Ÿ 4.0% ź
Wales 74.8% Ÿ 3.8% ź
N. Ireland 69.3% Ÿ 4.0% ź
UK 75.5% Ÿ 4.0% ź
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Outlook and Appraisal
As we argued back in June, there have been welcome signs of a gradual pick-up in activity in the Scottish 
economy after a sustained period of weak growth. Indeed, the most recent data point to Scotlands 
economy outpacing growth in the UK as a whole. These figures are clearly welcome, although below the 
surface businesses are becoming increasingly worried about the costs of a no-deal Brexit.  
Chart 1: Scottish growth since 2013, year and quarter
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Table 1: Employment & unemployment rates, May - July 2018
Employment (16-64) Unemployment (16+)
Rate (%)
Year 
Change
Rate (%)
Year 
Change
Scotland 75.1% ź 4.1% Ÿ
England 75.8% Ÿ 4.0% ź
Wales 74.8% Ÿ 3.8% ź
N. Ireland 69.3% Ÿ 4.0% ź
UK 75.5% Ÿ 4.0% ź
Source: ONS
Chart 2: Scottish economic growth revisions, 2010  Q1 2018
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Introduction
The Scottish economy grew by 0.5% in the 3-month 
period to June 2018  ahead of the UK for the 2nd 
consecutive quarter. (Chart 1 and Chart 2)
Growth over the year was the fastest since late 
2014/early 2015. Revisions for 2016 and 2017 
OLIWHGWKHRőFLDOJURZWKHVWLPDWHVPXFKFORVHUWR
our own forecasts. (Chart 3)
As outlined in June, we are slightly more optimistic 
about Scotlands near-term economic prospects 
than this time last year. 
On balance, our central view is that the Scottish 
economy is showing greater signs of resilience. 
Why? 
First, whilst there is undoubtedly heightened 
uncertainty around Brexit, many businesses appear 
to be looking-through such concerns and are 
getting on with day-to-day activities. But this is 
clearly fragile. And the apparent lack of contingency 
SODQQLQJE\PDQ\ŏUPVLVDVLJQLŏFDQWFRQFHUQ
Second, the outlook for oil and gas  and its all-
important supply chain  remains more positive 
than it has been in almost three years. 
Third, there are signs that the recent upturn is 
relative broad-based with most sectors currently 
posting positive returns.  
We forecast that growth will continue at around its 
current pace for the next 2 to 3 years. 
Of course, some of this upturn is cyclical and follows 
a sustained period of weak growth. The greatest 
risk to this forecast is from a no-deal Brexit. Whilst 
not sharing some of the concerns of the most 
pessimistic commentators regarding the potential 
negative hit to the economy should this happen, 
ZHGRWKLQNWKDWDFOLŎHGJHVFHQDULRZRXOGKDYH
serious short-term  and long-term  negative 
consequences for the Scottish economy. 
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Table 2: IMF forecasts for growth (%), 2017 (outturn) to 2019
2017* 2018 2019
UK 1.7 1.4 1.5
US 2.3 2.9 2.7
Japan 1.7 1.0 0.9
Canada 3.0 2.1 2.0
Euro Area 2.4 2.2 1.9
Germany 2.5 2.2 2.1
France 2.3 1.8 1.7
Italy 1.5 1.2 1.0
Source: IMF 
Chart 3: Euro-zone unemployment rate and real GDP since 2006
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Chart 4: Business confidence in the UKs major markets
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The global economy
Whilst the pace of growth in the world economy has 
slowed slightly, particularly in emerging economies, 
the outlook remains robust. 
Most predictions are for world growth to continue to 
be close to, or slightly above, average over the next 
couple of years. (Table 2)
7KHVOLJKWHDVLQJLQZRUOGJURZWKVHHPVWRUHŐHFWD
movement toward a more balanced type of growth, 
UDWKHUWKDQDPRUHVLJQLŏFDQWVORZGRZQ
There has been a gradual shift toward more 
sustainable drivers of growth such as trade, 
investment and wages across most major 
economies. 
At the same time, some structural problems  such 
DVXQHPSOR\PHQWLQ(XURSHóZKLOVWVWLOOVLJQLŏFDQW
continue to be slowly addressed. (Chart 3)
Overall sentiment and demand in Europe remains 
high and well ahead of the UK. (Chart 4)
Across the Atlantic, the US continues to power 
DKHDGGULYHQE\PRUHFRQŏGHQWKRXVHKROGVDQG
increasing investment. President Trumps tax cuts 
KDYHKHOSHGWRSURYLGHDVLJQLŏFDQWŏVFDOVWLPXOXV
(Chart 5). US unemployment is on track to fall to its 
lowest rate in around 50 years. 
Without Brexit, such factors would be pointing 
toward a highly positive outlook for Scottish 
H[SRUWLQJŏUPVRYHUWKHQH[WIHZPRQWKV
Chart 5: Contributions to US growth, Q1 2012  Q2 2018
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Chart 6: Policy rates in UK, US and Europe, 2013  2021
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Chart 7: Bad loans in Europe, 2016 and 2018
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Chart 8: Stock market indices, Jan 2013  Aug 2018
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Of course, there are risks to this outlook. 
The Trump administrations decision to increase 
WDULŎVRQVRPH(XURSHDQDQG&KLQHVHLPSRUWVKDV
escalated trade tensions. 
The short-run impact of a trade war may be more 
modest than one might expect (relative to the geo-
political consequences). But the potential damage 
to long-run prospects for growth is a concern. 
The strength of global growth has led to increased 
speculation about a gradual return to normality in 
interest rates. (Chart 6)
The US Fed increased rates by 25 basis points in 
June, with two further hikes pencilled in for 2018. 
The ECB plans to taper its QE programme, marking 
WKHŏUVWVWHSLQWKHXQZLQGLQJRILWVHPHUJHQF\
VXSSRUWHŎRUWV
%XWDFRPELQDWLRQRIŏVFDOFRQVROLGDWLRQ
weak productivity, bad loans  Chart 7  and 
demographics is likely to mean that the neutral 
interest rate in most economies will remain lower 
than pre-crisis averages for at least a decade. 
Equity prices have bounced back following their 
correction in February. Volatility has subsided and 
risk appetite has been strong. (Chart 8)
&RQVHTXHQWO\RYHUDOOŏQDQFLDOFRQGLWLRQVKDYH
remained highly supportive. 
Our colleague Gary Koop has co-developed a 
ŏQDQFLDODFFRXQWLQJLQGH[ZKLFKGUDZVRQGDWDVXFK
as equity, corporate bonds and interbank spreads. 
,WVKRZVJHQHUDOŏQDQFLDOFRQGLWLRQVUHPDLQKLJKO\
supportive. (Chart 9) 
Chart 9: Koop and Koroblis Financial Conditions Index, 2000   
2018 (values < 0 = supportive, values > 0 = restrictive)
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Chart 10: Monthly UK economic growth to  July 2018
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Chart 11: Annual GDP growth in G7 countries, 2016  2017
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Chart 12: UK manufacturing output, Jan 2008  Jul 2018
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The UK economy
)RUWKHŏUVWWLPHLQ-XO\WKH216SXEOLVKHG8.*'3
on a monthly and rolling 3-monthly basis.
The results require careful interpretation. 
)LUVWO\WKHODWHVW8.ŏJXUHVPLJKWQRWDOZD\VIROORZ
the traditional calendar quarters of Q1, Q2 etc. 
So growth comparisons  including with Scotland 
 need to ensure a like-for-like basis.  Secondly, 
month-to-month results will be volatile. (Chart 
2QHRŎHYHQWVóHJZHDWKHUóFRXOGKDYH
VLJQLŏFDQWLPSDFWVRQWKHKHDGOLQHUHVXOWV
Up to July, rolling 3-month growth of 0.6% was the 
highest since last summer. 
This pick-up follows a challenging start to 2018, 
and weak growth through 2017, when the UK lagged 
behind other G7 economies. (Chart 11). 
Within sectors, performance has been mixed. 
Manufacturing output fell over both the quarter and 
the year. 
With manufacturing activity still lower than a decade 
ago, any hope of boosting exports substantially  
and to the governments target of 35% of GDP  is 
hugely optimistic. (Chart 12)
A strong performance from consumer facing 
activities, driven by factors such as the good 
weather, boosted the summer growth numbers. 
The growth in consumer activity has also been 
boosted by an upturn in real earnings. But 
conditions remain challenging for many in the 
sector. Over the year to July, real terms regular 
earnings increased by 0.5%. (Chart 13)
Chart 13: Real and nominal earnings growth, Jan 2007 - Jul 2018
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Chart 14: Contributions to the UK savings ratio, 2013  2018
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Chart 15: Bank of England Agent Scores: capacity constraints & 
recruitment difficulties since August 2007
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Chart 16:  Change over year in employment by nationality, Apr-
Jun 2017  Apr-Jun 2018
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That being said, average regular pay remains around 
eSHUZHHNORZHUWKDQSULRUWRWKHŏQDQFLDOFULVLV
 and over £30 less when bonuses are included. 
As a result of this squeeze, the UK savings ratio (the 
proportion of income not spent each quarter) is at 
its lowest level in over 50 years. (Chart 14)
Some of the rise in wages is undoubtedly driven by 
the tight UK labour market. 
Unemployment of 4 per cent is the lowest since the 
winter of 1974-75. 
Whilst welcome, there is increasing evidence that 
this is posing recruitment challenges and wider 
capacity constraints. (Chart 15)
The number of people in work continues to grow, but 
there is also evidence of a fall back in the number of 
EU nationals in employment in the UK. (Chart 16)
:KHWKHURUQRWWKLVLVSDUWRIDõ%UH[LWHŎHFWöUHPDLQV
unclear. Reports from the Bank of Englands network 
of agents suggests that companies are becoming 
more uncertain about the outlook, with a fall-back in 
investment intentions. Contingency planning, whilst 
modest, is intensifying. 
This backdrop of fragility  albeit counterbalanced 
by positive indicators of current activity  will set the 
context for the upcoming 2018 UK Budget. 
Whilst borrowing continues to fall (Chart 17), with 
debt still above 80% of GDP, and rising pressures 
on health and social care costs, the Chancellor does 
not have his challenges to seek. 
Chart 17: UK public sector net borrowing by financial year, 
2014/15 to 2018/19 
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Chart 18: Scottish GDP since 2016
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Chart 19: Scotland vs. UK economic growth since 2013
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Chart 20: Composition of growth over year and latest quarter
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The Scottish economy
7KHODWHVW6FRWWLVK*'3JURZWKŏJXUHVZHUH
published last week (19th September). (Chart 18)
They showed a further pick-up in growth, with 
the Scottish economy expanding 0.5% over the 
3-months to June. This followed revised growth of 
LQWKHŏUVWPRQWKVRIWKH\HDU
7KHVHŏJXUHVFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHODWHVWVXUYH\
LQGLFDWRUVVKRZIXUWKHUHYLGHQFHRIWKHŏUVW
sustained period of expansion since the downturn 
in early 2015. Indeed, growth over the year to June 
2018 was the fastest since late 2014/early 2015. 
That being said, annual growth of 1.7% (quarter-to-
quarter) and 1.4% (4Q-on-4Q), still lags Scotlands 
long-term historical growth rates. 
The Scottish economy has outpaced the UK for the 
last two quarters and over the year as a whole. 
6RPHRIWKLVUHŐHFWVDGHJUHHRIF\FOLFDOFDWFKXS
with the UK having grown more strongly over the four 
years to late 2016, shown in Chart 19. 
But the upturn has been broad-based. Over Q2, 
there was growth of 0.6% in production activities, 
1.8% in construction and 0.4% in services. 
With services making up over 75% of activity  it is 
no surprise that Scotlands overall rate of growth has 
been shaped by services. (Chart 20)
Some of the improvement in the Scottish numbers 
XQGRXEWHGO\UHŐHFWVDPRUHSRVLWLYHRXWORRNIRURLO
and gas than last year  albeit cutbacks continue to 
be made. (Chart 21)
Chart 21: Capital and operating expenditure in the North Sea, 
1998-99 to 2017-18
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Scottish Economy Dashboard
Agriculture
% of  
Economy 2017 Q2 2018
Growth
Construction
 Ł6LJQLŏFDQWUHYLVLRQVWRRőFLDOGDWDSDLQWDPRUHSRVLWLYH
picture for sector than before
 ŁUplift in public sector capital investment should help 
support infrastructure, but wider measures of activity 
 including commercial property and house-building  
remain relatively subdued
 ŁSector grew in 2017 but is arguably most exposed to any 
hit to migration post-Brexit
 ŁSector will need clarity on support, opportunities and 
regulation post-Brexit to ensure growth can continue
Services
Retail and 
wholesale
Accommodation  
& food services
Financial & 
insurance
76%
10%
3% 
6%
0.9%
1.4%
0.3% 
-1.3%
0.4%
1.1%
-0.2% 
1.1%
 
 ŁAggregate data suggests a recent upturn in sector activity
 ŁMicro data suggests tough trading conditions, with many 
KLJKSURŏOHQDPHVRQWKHKLJKVWUHHWVWUXJJOLQJ
 ŁRising wages could give some respite to a sector going 
WKURXJKVLJQLŏFDQWVWUXFWXUDOFKDQJH
 ŁMixed performance with growth over the year, but some 
fall-back in the most recent quarter
 ŁLike retail, many casual eating and drinking 
establishments have been struggling. Changes in how 
households consume entertainment is impacting many 
business models
 ŁTourist faring elements of the sector continue to improve
 ŁRelative modest output in this key sector of the Scottish 
economy
 Ł8QOLNHRWKHUVHFWRUVGLUHFWO\H[SRVHGWRWKHŏQDQFLDOFULVLV
óVXFKDVSURIHVVLRQDOVHUYLFHVDQGUHDOHVWDWHóŏQDQFLDO
services has taken much longer to get back on its feet
 Ł8QFHUWDLQIXWXUHIRUŏQDQFLDOVHUYLFHVLQUHODWLRQWRWUDGLQJ
with Europe, even under the Chequers plan
Production
Manufacturing
Food and drink
17%
11%
3%
1.9%
1.7%
-0.7%
0.6%
0.9%
4.0%
 Ł  &RQŏGHQFHDQGJURZWKKDVUHWXUQHGUHFHQWO\óERRVWHGE\
a more positive outlook for the oil and gas supply chain
 Ł([SRUWHUVOLNHO\WRFRQWLQXHWREHQHŏWIURPZHDNSRXQG
and strong global economy. But also most likely to be at 
risk from dislocation of UK-EU trade
Key issues/trends
6%
1%
4.3%
4.5%
1.8%
-1.2%
 Ł  Sector continues to grow strongly  and is now at its 
highest ever level
 ŁGrowth potential is high, although boosting productivity in 
sector will be key for sustainability
 ŁFuture post-Brexit challenges could include just-in-time 
deliveries and access to migrant workers
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Chart 22: Manufacturing and Food & Drink in Scotland, Q1 2013 
 Q2 2018
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Chart 23: Growth in services over quarter and year
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Chart 24: Financial services in Scotland since the crisis
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But there is also increasing evidence of a wider 
recovery.  For example, manufacturing grew by 
0.9% over the quarter and by 3.2% over the year on 
4Q-on-4Q basis.  
A key driver of this has been the strong growth in 
Scotlands food and drink sector. The sector has 
grown 3.0% over the year on a 4Q-on-4Q basis to 
reach its highest ever level. (Chart 22)
Whilst electricity and gas supply activity has slipped 
back a little in the most recent quarter, growth was 
strong over the year buoyed by renewables output. 
Within services, growth has been more modest but  
for the most part  broadly positive. (Chart 23)
Retail and accommodation and food sectors have 
picked-up. Whilst positive, it is clear from wider 
LQGLFDWRUVWKDWVXFKVHFWRUVFRQWLQXHWRŏQGWUDGLQJ
conditions challenging. 
If the rise in earnings continues to build momentum, 
then this should provide some respite. However, 
many of the challenges that they face are more 
structural and relate to the way in which people 
now choose to consume such services (e.g. online 
retailing). 
2QHVHFWRUZKLFKUHWXUQHGWRJURZWKZDVŏQDQFLDO
services, which grew by 1.1% in Q2.  
But as Chart 24 highlights, the sector continues to 
lag behind its counterparts, such as real estate and 
professional services. (Chart 24)
7KDWVDLG6FRWODQGöVŏQDQFLDOVHUYLFHVLQGXVWU\
DSSHDUVWREHQRGLŎHUHQWLQRSHUDWLQJRQDVOLJKWO\
VPDOOHUVFDOHóSRVWŏQDQFLDOFULVLVóWKDQWKH8.
sector. (Chart 25)
Chart 25: Financial services in Scotland since the crisis
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Chart 26: Revisions to construction GDP, Q1 2010 = 100, Q1 
2010  Q2 2018
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Chart 27: Revisions to GDP growth, %, 2011  2017
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Chart 28: Commercial property transactions in Scotland, 2007-
08 to 2017-18
 -
 1,000
 2,000
 3,000
 4,000
 5,000
 6,000
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
T
o
ta
l 
n
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
tr
a
n
s
a
c
ti
o
n
s
T
o
ta
l 
v
a
lu
e
 o
f 
s
a
le
s
 (
£
 b
n
)
Volume of Transactions (RHS)
Value of Sales (LHS)
Source: National Registers of Scotland
Revisions to Scottish construction data
Back in June, we discussed the puzzling patterns in 
the Scottish construction series. 
7KHRőFLDO6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQWGDWDKDGEHHQ
showing a sharp rise in construction activity during 
2014 and 2015  by around 30% - before falling 
back in 2017 and 2018. 
The scale of such changes was unprecedented. 
7KHJRYHUQPHQWKDGK\SRWKHVLVHGWKDWWKHŏJXUHV
were driven  in part  by a number of major 
infrastructure projects coming to an end (such as the 
Queensferry Crossing and M8 upgrade). 
But even with expanded borrowing powers, and 
JURZLQJFDSLWDOEXGJHWVWKLVZDVDOZD\VGLőFXOWWR
reconcile with activity on the ground and what other 
data was telling us. 
In August, the statistics were revised substantially 
&KDUW7KHRőFLDOGDWDQRZVKRZFRQVWUXFWLRQ
growing since 2014, with only a modest decline in 
recent times.
As a result, even though construction accounts for 
just 6% of our economy, the revisions were of such 
DODUJHVFDOHWKDWWKH\FKDQJHGWKHHQWLUHSURŏOHRI
growth in the Scottish economy. (Chart 27)
In June, the Scottish Government published growth 
HVWLPDWHVIRURIMXVW1RZWKDWŏJXUHLV
1.3%.   
That being said, the changes do not alter Scotlands 
ORQJWHUPJURZWKSURŏOHZLWK*'3SHUKHDGVWLOO
rising by just under 2% over the decade). 
Revisions are an important and necessary part 
of producing robust economic statistics. And 
there are advantages in making major changes to 
methodology at set points in time.
These data have wider implications with sustained 
weak economic performance unlocking emergency 
borrowing, depending on the performance of the 
economy. 
So one lesson is perhaps the need to revise more 
TXLFNO\LIWKHRőFLDOPHWKRGRORJ\LVFOHDUO\DQG
VLJQLŏFDQWO\ inconsistent with wider evidence. 
Double checking a suite of data, e.g. commercial 
transactions, actual Scottish Government data on 
infrastructure spending, housing completions etc, 
should provide a more accurate picture. (Chart 28)
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Table 3: Scotland and UK labour market, May - Jul 2018
Employment 
rate 
(16-64)
Unemployment 
rate 
(16+)
Inactivity 
rate 
(16-64)
Scotland 75.1% 4.1% 21.7%
Quarterly change (pp) -0.1 -0.2 0.3
Annual change (pp) -0.8 0.3 0.5
UK 75.5% 4.0% 21.2%
Quarterly change (pp) -0.1 -0.2 0.3
Annual change (pp) 0.2 -0.3 0.0
Source: ONS, LFS
Chart 29: 16-24 unemployment rate, Apr 2017 - Mar 2018 
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Chart 30: Number of employees and self-employed in Scotland 
since 2007
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Scottish labour market
Unemployment in Scotland remains low and, taking 
WKHFRQŏGHQFHLQWHUYDOVDURXQGKHDGOLQHHVWLPDWHV
LQWRDFFRXQWHŎHFWLYHO\QRGLŎHUHQWIURPWKH8.
But over the last year, there has been a degree of 
weakening in labour market outcomes. Employment 
has fallen by around 40,000, whilst there has been a 
rise 7,000 in unemployment. (Table 3)
One big success story for the labour market in 
Scotland in recent years has been substantial 
drops in youth (16-24) unemployment. Scotland 
currently has the lowest 16-24 unemployment rate 
of anywhere in the UK. (Chart 29)
One feature we have discussed in past 
commentaries, has been the rise in part-time work 
and self-employment, with a corresponding relative 
squeeze on the number of full-time employees. 
Interestingly, over the last year to 18 months this 
trend has eased. Instead, the number of employees 
has been on the rise, as has the number of full-time 
workers. (Chart 30)
The fall in employment, alongside the revisions to 
GDP growth by the Scottish Government, has led to 
a bounce back in Scotlands productivity numbers. 
Labour productivity in Scotland is nearly 4% higher 
than this time last year. 
However, these revisions do little to alter Scotlands 
relatively weak track record in productivity  with 
last years boost counterbalanced by weaker than 
before estimates for productivity in earlier years. 
(Chart 31)
As a result, productivity in Scotland is largely back at 
2011 levels.
Chart 31: Revised productivity estimates, Q1 2010  Q1 2018
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Chart 32: Components of Scottish Productivity, 1998  2017
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Chart 33: Growth in employment from 1997-2017 and GVA per 
hour worked in 2016, size of circle indicates the number of 
workers in that sector
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Chart 34: Royal Bank of Scotland PMI, Jan 2016  Aug 2018
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Over a longer time horizon, productivity has lagged 
behind wider growth in the economy. The slack has 
been picked up by rising employment. (Chart 32)
But with an ageing population, employment at near 
record levels, and uncertainty over the future of 
PLJUDWLRQSRVW%UH[LWLWLVQRWGLőFXOWWRVHHZK\
turning around Scotlands productivity performance 
is so crucial to future prosperity.
*UHDWHUHőFLHQF\QRWMXVWLQKLJKYDOXHDGGHG
sectors, but across our economy will be key. (Chart 
33)
Latest Scottish indicators
Over the summer, indicators of day-to-day activity in 
the Scottish economy have held up relatively well. 
This backs up the assessment we made in June that, 
despite Brexit uncertainty, underlying economic 
conditions have strengthened a little. We retain that 
cautious optimism.  
Some of this is undoubtedly tied to a more positive 
outlook for oil and gas. But there are also signs that 
activity has been stabilising or picking-up across the 
wider economy.  
For example, at 55.5, the RBS Purchasing Managers 
Index (where >50 marks expansion; <50 marks 
contraction) is the strongest it has been in four 
\HDUV,QGHHGODVWPRQWKöVŏJXUHZDVWKHŏUVWWLPH
since July 2016 that Scotland outpaced the UK 
average. (Chart 34)
A similar rise in activity was found in the latest 
Quarterly Economic Indicator from the Scottish 
Chamber of Commerce. 
All sectors were showing positive trading conditions 
and optimism in Q2 2018, with tourism once again 
leading the way. (Chart 35)
Our own Scottish Business Monitor  produced in 
association with RBS  highlights a similar picture. 
The latest results for new and repeat business 
continue to grow. (Chart 36)
Optimism is also on the rise.
One exception to this was the latest Federation of 
6PDOO%XVLQHVVHV6FRWODQGFRQŏGHQFHLQGH[ZKLFK
fell from plus 5.1 points to minus 13.2 points with 
Scottish businesses amongst the most concerned in 
the UK about a no-deal Brexit.
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Chart 35: Quarterly Economic Indicator: business optimism, Q3 
2014  Q2 2018
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Chart 36: Scottish Business Monitor: repeat and new business, 
Q1 2013  Expected Q3 2018
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Chart 37: Scottish Business Monitor: turnover and costs, Q1 
1998  Q2 2018
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One advantage of our Business Monitor is the ability 
to track trends in activity over time. The survey has 
been running on a consistent basis since 1998. It 
therefore provides a valuable record of conditions in 
the Scottish economy. 
2YHUWLPHZHŏQGWKDWóRQEDODQFHóPRVWŏUPV
tend to report costs rising ahead of turnover. Clearly 
this cannot happen forever, and shows an inherent 
QHUYRXVQHVVEXLOWLQWRPRVWŏUPVöLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI
current conditions (i.e. they tend to be more worried 
about costs rather than opportunities). (Chart 37)
What is revealing however, is where the gap widens 
and narrows and how closely this tracks Scotlands 
growth record. When the gap grows - e.g. 2008/09 
and 2015/16  growth slows. When the gap 
narrows, growth tends to pick-up. 
Another advantage of our Business Monitor, is the 
ability to track hot topics over time. 
$FFHVVWRŏQDQFHDQGDFFHVVWRZRUNHUVLVMXVWRQH
HOHPHQW:HŏQGDVXVWDLQHGIDOOLQWKHQXPEHURI
ŏUPVFLWLQJFUHGLWDYDLODELOLW\DVDQLPSRUWDQWLVVXH
IRUWKHPEXWULVHLQFRQFHUQVRYHUVWDŎDYDLODELOLW\
(Chart 38)
One interpretation of these data is that the current 
period of heightened uncertainty is leading 
businesses to meet any increase in demand by 
taking on more workers, rather than investing in new 
plant and machinery. 
7KHVHGDWDSRVHTXHVWLRQVIRUUHFHQWHŎRUWVóVXFK
as the new Scottish National Investment Bank and 
British Business Bank  to boost the supply of 
ŏQDQFH2XUVXUYH\VXJJHVWVWKDWGHPDQGIRUFUHGLW
is likely to be just as important.
Chart 38: Scottish Business Monitor: credit and staff availability 
important/very important, Q1 1998  Q2 2018
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Chart 39: Consumer Sentiment Index current conditions: the 
economy, household finances and spending, Q2 2013  Q2 
2018
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Chart 40: Consumer confidence in Scotland and the UK, Jan 
2016  Aug 2018
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Chart 41: Consumer Sentiment Index expectations: Scottish 
economy, Q2 2013  Q2 2018
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One area of ongoing fragility is around consumer 
DQGKRXVHKROGFRQŏGHQFH
Scottish households assessment of current 
conditions remains weak  although they have at 
least stabilised in recent times. (Chart 39 and 40).
For comparisons the GfK indicator for August 2018 
was -13.
It would appear that the key driver of the slightly 
more pessimistic outlook is households 
expectations for the economy. 
In contrast to their expectations for their own 
ŏQDQFHVZKLFKUHPDLQSRVLWLYHDQLQFUHDVLQJ
number believe that the outlook for the economy is 
negative. (Chart 41)
The outlook for the labour market however, remains 
positive. (Chart 42)
The latest Royal Bank of Scotland Report on Jobs 
shows its headline indicator for labour market 
activity remains above its 12 month rolling average.
This should help  in time  put upward pressure on 
real wages, bolstering household incomes.
Chart 42: Jobs market indicator, Jan 2013  Aug 2018
50
52
54
56
58
60
62
64
66
68
70
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
B
a
ro
m
e
te
r 
(>
5
0
 =
 e
x
p
a
n
s
io
n
)
Scotland
UK
Scotland 12m moving average
Source: RBS & IHS Markit 
17 Fraser of Allander Institute
Chart 43: What has been the impact of the Brexit decision, to 
date, on your business?
No change
49%
Positive change
6%
Negative change
44%
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
Chart 44: How has the Brexit decision affected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Your current investment activity?
Any proposed new investment activity?
New staff recruitment?
Your ability to retain existing staff?
You starting any new business projects?
% of responses
Negatively No change Positively
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
Chart 45: Do you feel that your business is prepared for Brexit?
Yes
38%
No
62%
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
Focus: FAI Brexit survey
,Q-XO\ZHXQGHUWRRNDVXUYH\RI6FRWWLVKŏUPV
to assess their preparedness for Brexit. Over the 
course of the month we spoke to around 350 
businesses from across the country and from a 
YDULHW\RIGLŎHUHQWVHFWRUV
The focus of the survey was not on whether or not 
businesses believe Brexit to be good or bad, but 
instead, how their preparatory plans were taking 
shape.
Around half of the businesses we spoke to said that 
the decision so far had no impact on their business 
activity. Only 6% said it had been positive, with 44% 
saying the impact had been negative. (Chart 43)
RIŏUPVVDLGWKDWLWKDVKDGDQHJDWLYHLPSDFW
on current investment activity (4% positive), with 
41% saying that it has had a negative impact on new 
investment (3% positive). 
33% indicated that it has had a negative impact on 
VWDŎUHFUXLWPHQWSRVLWLYH&KDUW
Brexit is happening, like-it-or-not. So it is vital that 
businesses prepare for such an eventuality. We 
DVNHGŏUPVDERXWWKHLUSUHSDUHGQHVVIRU%UH[LW
Only 38% said that they believed that they were 
prepared for Brexit. (Chart 45)
We also asked about the level of information that is 
available to them to make such preparations.
The overwhelming response was that there is not 
enough information currently available to enable 
them to plan for potential Brexit outcomes. 
Uncertainty over the UK Governments objectives 
in the negotiations was the most popular response 
amongst businesses (with over 59% citing this as a 
factor).
Finally, in terms of possible opportunities. Whilst 
51% of business surveyed indicated that they did 
QRWVHHDQ\LPPHGLDWHEHQHŏWVRIWKRVH
VXUYH\HGEHOLHYHGWKDWWKHUHPLJKWEHEHQHŏWVIURP
moving away from EU regulations with 26% pointing 
to possible increased funding from the Scottish and/
or UK Government in the future. Only 18% thought of 
opportunities in new markets outside the EU.
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Chart 46: FAI nowcast and the latest release of Scottish GDP 
estimates, Q1 2016  Q3 2018
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Table 4: Nowcasts for Scotlands GDP in Q2 and Q3 2018
Q2 Q3
Quarterly Growth 0.33% 0.39%
Annualised Growth 1.34% 1.57%
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
Chart 47: FAI forecast Scottish economic growth range
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SDVWIRUHFDVWVDWGLŎHUHQWIRUHFDVWKRUL]RQV
Our forecasts
Chart 46 shows our latest nowcasts and also how 
WKH\KDYHWUDFNHGDJDLQVWWKHRőFLDOGDWDERWK
before and after the recent revisions to the GDP 
series. 
Our nowcasts do a much better job of tracking the 
UHYLVHGHVWLPDWHVRI*'3FRPSDUHGWRWKHŏUVW
estimates. 
/DVWZHHNöVGDWDFRQŏUPHGWKDWJURZWKFRQWLQXHG
LQWRWKHQGTXDUWHURISLFNLQJXSRYHUWKHŏUVW
three months. 
As we have discussed before, quarterly results for 
Scotland can be relatively volatile given the size of 
the economy. 
The latest results are therefore broadly consistent 
with our expectations for growth in 2018 that we 
ŏUVWPDGHEDFNLQ
On balance, we believe that  setting aside any risks 
from the Brexit negotiations going awry  Scotland 
should be on track to grow at a broadly similar rate 
to last year (if not slightly faster). (Table 4) 
Turning to our forecasts for the next three years, 
as in the past, we report a central forecast but also 
uncertainty bands that set out a likely range within 
which we predict Scottish economic growth will lie. 
It is important to note that such bands are based 
upon historical variations in our normal forecasting 
performance. Looking ahead, the potential for a no-
deal Brexit outcome is clearly not a normal event. 
Should this occur, an entirely new set of forecasts 
will be required. But with so much uncertainty over 
what this could mean  politically and economically 
 we have not published such an estimate at this 
stage. An update will be provided in December. 
Overall, our base forecasts are very similar to June. 
(Table 4 and Chart 47)
Table 5:  FAI forecast Scottish GDP growth (%) 2018 to 2020
2018 2019 2020
GDP 1.3% 1.4% 1.4%
Production 1.5% 1.6% 1.5%
Construction 1.0% 1.1% 1.0%
Services 1.2% 1.4% 1.3%
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
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Table 6: Latest growth forecasts for the UK economy
2018 2019 2020
Bank of England 1.5 1.8 1.7
OBR 1.5 1.3 1.3
NIESR 1.4 1.7 1.7
European Commission 1.5 1.2 -
IMF 1.4 1.5 -
Oxford Economics 1.3 1.4 2.0
ITEM Club 1.3 1.5 1.7
CBI 1.5 1.3 -
Source: HM Treasury, Bank of England, OBR
Chart 48: FAI GDP forecasts by sector, 2018  2020
0.0%
0.4%
0.8%
1.2%
1.6%
2.0%
2018 2019 2020
G
ro
w
th
GVA Production Construction Services
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
Table 7: FAI Labour Market forecasts to 2020
2018 2019 2020
Employee jobs  2,495,250  2,521,950  2,547,550 
% employee job 
growth over year
1.0% 1.0% 1.0%
ILO unemployment  111,400  114,150  118,900 
Rate (%)1 4.2% 4.2% 4.3%
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
Absolute numbers are rounded to the nearest 50.
1 Rate calculated as total ILO unemployment divided by total of 
economically active population aged 16 and over.
Our central forecast is for growth of 1.3% in 2018 
followed by growth of 1.4% in 2019 and 2020. 
In short, we believe that the Scottish economy will 
grow this year, will quicken slightly over the forecast 
horizon, but growth will remain below trend. 
Our latest forecasts for Scotland put us slightly 
behind the Bank of Englands forecast for the UK 
economy but ahead of the OBRs UK forecast. 
(Table 5). Whilst we do not forecast the UK economy 
directly, on balance, we believe that Scotland will do 
well to match UK growth over the next few years. 
$QRGHDORXWFRPHZRXOGVLJQLŏFDQWO\ORZHURXU
forecasts as businesses adjust to this new normal. 
With nominal earnings growth expected to continue 
WRSLFNXSDQGSURYLGHGWKDWWKLVRXWSDFHVLQŐDWLRQ
household spending should see some modest 
gains. 
Investment activity is likely to remain under pressure 
as Brexit-uncertainty continues to cast a shadow 
over growth ambitions. This element of our forecast 
carries the greatest risk and has the greatest 
potential to be negatively hit should a no-deal 
outcome become a reality.   
Net exports and tourism are on track to continue to 
EHQHŏWIURPWKHORZYDOXHRI6WHUOLQJ
As in recent years, services should make the 
greatest contribution to overall growth. However, 
we also expect the outlook for manufacturing 
to continue to be more positive, particularly as 
optimism in the North Sea supply chain continues to 
improve. 
Building on recent growth, professional and 
business services are placed to do better. And with 
major new public investment in the pipeline, the 
construction sector should continue to see a more 
sustained outlook. 
We expect unemployment to rise slightly toward a 
level consistent with more medium-term trends. So 
any reported rise in unemployment in the coming 
months should pose little concern. (Table 6)
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Policy context
Tackling regional economic inequalities
Tackling regional economic disparities has been a 
priority of successive governments in both the UK 
and Scotland. 
The UK Governments Industrial Strategy is 
their latest attempt, with regional growth 1 of 
5 foundations of success. Here in Scotland, 
cohesion  or its new term regional inclusive 
growth  has been a feature of the Scottish 
Governments Economic Strategy since 2007. 
It is hard to disagree that a country will be 
economically stronger if every region has the 
RSSRUWXQLW\WRIXOŏOLWVSRWHQWLDO
However, Scottish and UK policy history is 
littered with well-intentioned  but ultimately ill-
fated  attempts to narrow the gap in economic 
performance between regions. Many of the 
challenges are deep-rooted and structural, whilst 
attempts to tackle them throw-up challenging trade-
RŎVDQGSROLWLFDOULVNV
Regional inequalities in Scotland and the 
UK
Much has been written about the unbalanced nature 
of the UK economy. 
Scotland performs relatively well despite that 
context. Our onshore GDP per head was just below 
£25k in 2016 - 3rd behind London and the South 
East. 
Chart 49: GVA per head across the UK (2016)
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What is stark is the variation in economic 
performance by UK region. GVA per head in London 
is over 70% higher than the UK average. (Chart 49)
Looking at the more disaggregated data the 
disparity is even greater. It is clear that the UK, or 
PRUHVSHFLŏFDOO\RQHSDUWRI/RQGRQVWDQGVDVDQ
outlier in Europe. (Chart 50)
Chart 50: GVA per head, difference between richest and poorest 
parts of EU countries (NUTS2 regions, 2016)
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
160,000
180,000
B
e
lg
iu
m
B
u
lg
a
ri
a
C
z
e
c
h
 R
e
p
u
b
li
c
D
e
n
m
a
rk
G
e
rm
a
n
y
E
s
to
n
ia
Ir
e
la
n
d
G
re
e
c
e
S
p
a
in
F
ra
n
c
e
C
ro
a
ti
a
It
a
ly
C
y
p
ru
s
L
a
tv
ia
L
it
h
u
a
n
ia
L
u
x
e
m
b
o
u
rg
H
u
n
g
a
ry
M
a
lt
a
N
e
th
e
rl
a
n
d
s
A
u
s
tr
ia
P
o
la
n
d
P
o
rt
u
g
a
l
R
o
m
a
n
ia
S
lo
v
e
n
ia
S
lo
v
a
k
ia
F
in
la
n
d
S
w
e
d
e
n
U
n
it
e
d
 K
in
g
d
o
m
G
D
P
 p
e
r 
p
e
rs
o
n
 (
p
u
rc
h
a
s
in
g
 p
o
w
e
r 
s
ta
n
d
a
rd
)
Range
Source: Eurostat & FAI Calculations
One might expect the dominance of London to have 
ZDQHGIROORZLQJWKHŏQDQFLDOFULVLV,IDQ\WKLQJLW
has increased, widening UK interregional disparities. 
But before we think that this is just a London or UK 
phenomenon, the same data also reveals the scale 
of regional inequality in Scotland. (Chart 51)
Chart 51: GVA per head Scotlands NUTS 2 regions (2016)
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GVA per head in Edinburgh is nearly 2.5 times higher 
than in East and North Ayrshire. And over time, the 
gap has widened. GVA per head in the capital has 
nearly doubled since devolution, with growth in East 
and North Ayrshire around half that rate. 
This translates into widening economic and social 
outcomes across Scotland. In North Ayrshire 
for example, around a third of children are in 
KRXVHKROGVFODVVLŏHGDVEHLQJLQUHODWLYHSRYHUW\
And back in 2007, the Scottish Government 
established a target to narrow the gap in 
employment between the three best performing 
and the three worst performing local authorities in 
Scotland.  
As the chart below highlights, a decade later, the 
gap remains largely the same.  (Chart 52)
Chart 52: Difference in employment rate for the three best and 
worst performing Local Authorities (2004  2017)
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The Centre for Regional Inclusive Growth
This summer the Scottish Government launched its 
Centre for Regional Inclusive Growth. 
So far this is a website. It pulls together local 
information and statistics. But the Centre does not 
\HWRŎHUDQ\IUHVKLQVLJKWVLQWRKRZWRWDFNOHWKH
questions that have underpinned this policy area for 
decades. 
Indeed, on policy solutions, evaluation of current 
programmes or plans for new investment, it is silent. 
The website points to Regional Partnerships which 
are to come forward with new ideas but there is little 
detail on what resource will be made available and 
how asks to central government will be acted upon. 
Perhaps we will see more in the upcoming Budget.
Policy opportunities and challenges with 
Regional Inclusive Growth
So one cannot help follow recent UK and Scottish 
Government initiatives and ask the question  so 
what happens next? It is hard not to be sceptical 
over any hope that current initiatives will tackle 
the wide and deep-rooted variations in economic 
performance across Scotland.
Narrowing regional inequalities is not easy. The 
challenges are complex and  often  deep-rooted. 
Firstly, there are a great many structural factors why 
some parts of the country lag behind. 
For example, the industrial mix of regions varies 
VLJQLŏFDQWO\0DQ\RIWKHFKDOOHQJHVWKDWSDUWVRI
west central Scotland face can be traced to the rapid 
de-industrialisation of the 1970s and 1980s and a 
reliance on relatively low value service industries. 
Social deprivation and health barriers often act as 
self-reinforcing barriers to economic prosperity. 
Geography also plays a part, with much of Scotland 
subject to the challenges of rurality and remoteness. 
Parts of our cities struggle with poor housing stock 
and wider basic infrastructure.
The make-up of a regions population can also act as 
DVLJQLŏFDQWGUDJRQORQJWHUPJURZWK6RPHRIWKH
most fragile parts of the country are on track to lose 
population over the next few years.  (Chart 53)
Chart 53: Projected population growth in Local Authorities in 
Scotland, 2016-2026
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Secondly, local areas often lack the tools to 
turnaround their economic performance (beyond 
limited interventions at the margins). Many of the 
OHYHUVWKDWZLOOPDNHDGLŎHUHQFHóMREVKHDOWK
and well-being, population, digital and transport 
connectivity  are national responsibilities.  
Indeed, a quick glance at the diagnostic results 
from the Centres pilot study for North Ayrshire 
poses the question, what realistic levers do local 
SROLF\PDNHUVKDYHWRHŎHFWFKDQJHLQWKHVHDUHDV"ù
(Chart 54)
At the same time, local government budgets 
have been squeezed putting pressure on local 
government jobs and wages. As local authorities 
prioritise statutory responsibilities, it is no surprise 
that many have scaled back support for economic 
development. 
Chart 54: Prioritisation matrix for North Ayrshire 
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Interestingly, the mechanism for funding local 
authorities has not changed much over time, and 
certainly not since regional inclusive growth has 
risen up the policy agenda. Perhaps that needs to 
change?
Thirdly, there is often a basic tension at the heart 
of national economic policy over where resources 
are targeted, particularly in a world of tight public 
spending. 
2QWKHRQHKDQGSULRULWLVLQJSROLF\HŎRUWVDWDUHDV
of economic strength  like the strong parts of our 
cities  can create spill-overs, promote international 
FRPSHWLWLYHQHVVDQGOHDGWRQDWLRQDOEHQHŏWV%XW
on the other hand, it is arguably only by shifting 
resources to areas in economic need that can one 
realistically expect gaps to be narrowed. 
We have seen this played out in recent months, most 
visibly in the case of North Ayrshire. 
The decision to locate the new Medicines 
Manufacturing Innovation Centre (MMIC) close 
to Glasgow Airport might make sense from an 
agglomeration and connectivity perspective. From 
an inclusive growth perspective, it passed up an 
opportunity to support private sector activity and 
the creation of skilled jobs - as part of an Ayrshire 
Growth Deal  in an area of the country where such 
investment is rarely undertaken and much needed. 
The decision to locate the new Social Security 
Agency in Dundee was another such example. On 
this occasion, despite North Ayrshire being clearly 
LGHQWLŏHGDVVFRULQJEHVWIRUõLQFOXVLYHJURZWKöLW
was passed over by national policy makers because 
it was felt that the local authority might struggle to 
attract people to work there (despite transport links 
improving).   
Anyone can agree or disagree with such a decision, 
and few would argue with the importance of 
ensuring that the new Social Security Agency 
SHUIRUPVHŎHFWLYHO\IURPGD\RQH%XWLWDUJXDEO\
highlights that even the Scottish Government itself  
the key advocate of regional inclusive growth  often 
ŏQGVLWGLőFXOWWREDFNXSLWVYLVLRQZLWKLQYHVWPHQW
and funding support.  
Finally, and an issue we have raised in previous 
commentaries, is that in attempting to be all-things-
to-all-people, the policy landscape can become 
complex and cluttered. 
Currently, we have a patchwork of 32 local 
authorities, various City-Region Deals, a new suite 
of Regional Partnerships, not to mention the large 
number of strategies and programmes many of 
which have their own regional dimension (including 
32 Single Outcome Agreements).
Coordinating such activity across boundaries, 
GLŎHUHQWWLHUVRIJRYHUQPHQWDQGJRYHUQDQFHó
RIWHQRIGLŎHUHQWSROLWLFDOKXHVóLQHYLWDEO\PDNHV
for a complex delivery landscape.
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Summary
Delivering regional inclusive growth is not easy. 
5HJLRQDOGLVSDULWLHVUHŐHFWGHFDGHVRIVRFLDODQG
economic change, as well as the basic geography of 
Scotland.
The Scottish Government should be commended for 
pushing it up the policy agenda.
Ultimately, however, tackling regional inequalities 
ZLOORQO\EHDFKLHYHGE\LQYHVWLQJVLJQLŏFDQWO\LQ
Scotlands more fragile economic communities, 
ŏQGLQJRXWZKDWZRUNVDQGZKDWGRHVQRWDQG
prioritising some areas of the country over others 
whatever the impact on wider economic and political 
objectives.  
Otherwise, we run the risk of continuing to talk 
about these issues while regional inequalities 
continue to widen.  
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Reappraising Scotlands exports and their geographies: 
Brexit and beyond 
Ronald V. Kalafsky, University of Tennessee and Ross Brown, University of St Andrews 
  
 
Abstract 
Firms internationalise to expand and diversify their sales, while policymakers see exports as a 
means of promoting productivity and economic growth.  Exports therefore receive an increasing 
amount of attention given these positive attributes. Within this context, this paper presents data 
on the geographies and dynamics of Scotlands export patterns. It shows that Scottish exports 
are highly concentrated within a small number of global markets, with Scottish firms exhibiting 
a decreasing reliance on exports to the European Union.  Only a small minority of Scottish SMEs 
export and the majority of these firms derive less than a quarter of their sales from international 
markets. These lines of enquiry are presented within the context of the impending departure of 
the UK from the European Union and what this might mean for Scotlands exporters. The paper 
ends with some indicative policy recommendations.   
 
I   Introduction 
Policymakers understandably direct a fair amount of attention to exporting, given its potential 
for jobs, innovation and economic growth (Wright et al, 2007; Love and Roper, 2015). 
Underscoring this interest, a seminal paper on firm-level exporting motivations suggests that 
the policy-led support for exports, regardless of location, stems from the understanding that, 
exports are good, and exporters are good firms; thus helping domestic firms export is good 
policy (Bernard and Jensen, 2004, p. 561). Understandably therefore, trade policy has often 
been at the centrepiece of industrial policies within modern economies (Rodrik et al, 2004).  
Accordingly, a healthy amount of attention is paid to exporters and their dynamics at various 
scales. From a firm-level perspective, exporting offers the potential to expand beyond domestic 
or regional markets  markets that, in some cases, which may be in decline or offer diminished 
growth prospects.  From a national perspective, exporting offers countries the ability to enhance 
their growth prospects.  That said, the relationship between exporting and economic growth are 
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far from unequivocal (Mookerjee, 2006). The effects of exporting are often dependent on the 
national milieu in which trade takes place and includes the composition of exports in terms of 
individual products and services and even the destinations to which exports are sent. Clearly, 
the topic merits more attention and study.  
This topic is particularly salient to Scotland, as a small, open economy with a limited domestic 
market. Accordingly, recent policy papers have examined the export dynamics of Scotland, 
finding that exports are critically important especially for some key sectors (Slow et al, 2015; 
Hamilton and Richmond, 2017). What these studies also suggest is that Scotland often lags 
much of the rest of the United Kingdom in key measures such as the number of firms engaging 
in exporting.  This is reflected by fact that just 70 firms account for some 50% of Scotlands total 
exports1.  
Figure 1 Export intensities for Scotland and the United Kingdom (exports as a percentage of GDP) 
 
 
Source: Scottish Government 2018a; Scottish Government 2018b; World Bank 2018a. Calculations by Authors 
 
As a starting point in this analysis, Figure 1 provides export intensities for Scotland since 2002 
relative to the UK as a whole.  Exports as a percentage of GDP are approximately a third lower in 
Scotland compared to the UK.  Note the drop in exporting from 2002 to 2006, attributable to the 
                                                                
1 https://www.insider.co.uk/news/nicola-sturgeon-government-economy-programme-13191792 
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winding down of the predominantly foreign-owned, export-intensive (Silicon Glen) electronics 
sector during this period. And while Scotlands export intensity has rebounded since this and 
the ensuing global financial crisis, it has not returned to the levels seen in 2002.  
At the outset, then, this suggests there is a significant and continuous export gap between 
Scotland and the rest of the UK.  This weak export performance may in turn be partly attributable 
to the countrys weaker growth and productivity performance relative to the UK as a whole.  It 
also raises questions about the international markets that Scottish exporters are serving and 
what insights such patterns might provide on the future export trajectories of Scotland. In line 
with this, the next section provides an examination of these export geographies. 
 
II   Scotlands export geographies 
There is a growing amount of research on the markets to which firms export and how these are 
selected, largely because of how these geographies might help to provide an understanding of 
export strategies and innovation. A large body of evidence points to firms exporting to nearby, 
familiar, or long-time markets  a pattern that is especially salient for small-and-medium-sized 
firms (SMEs) (Bernard, et al, 2007; Defever, et al, 2015). That is, exporters tend to minimize risks 
and costs by accessing geographically proximate markets or those markets with which they or 
associated firms have some familiarity or affinity. Indeed, this is reflected in the famous 
Uppsala model which is used to depict how firms select geographically proximate foreign 
markets with low levels of psychic distance (Johanson and Vahlne, 2007).   
Within this context, what is considered to be a nearby, or for that matter, a distant market? 
Ghemawat (2001) neatly categorised distance (in terms of international business) into four 
distinct categories: geographical, cultural, administrative, and economic. The reason that these 
types of factors are mentioned is that in many ways, they are germane to Scotlands export 
performance and to understanding its export geographies. What these frameworks suggest is 
that Scottish firms, especially less resourceful SMEs, typically favour neighbouring markets with 
low levels of geographical and physic distance.   
Figure 2 provides an examination of the leading destinations for Scottish exports in 2016. Note 
that the United States is far and away the leading destination, accounting for 16% of total 
Scottish exports. Notably, the second leading export destination, the Netherlands, accounts for 
less than half of that (i.e. 7.1%). The reasons why firms choose (or do not choose) specific 
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markets are numerous. Many researchers attribute the volume of trade to the various forms of 
distance referenced earlier. In line with this, note that eight of Scotlands top-ten export markets 
are either in the European Union (EU) or part of the European Economic Area (EEA). In this sense, 
these leading export destinations reflect not only a sort of reduced geographical distance (i.e. 
relative proximity) but also, a form of administrative and psychic proximity. In other words, being 
within the same trade bloc brings economies closer together.  The other two, top-10 export 
destinations, the US and Brazil, are large markets in their own right.  With respect to the US, it 
has longstanding ties with Scotland, a point which also factors into a sort of cultural and 
economic proximity. Socio-economic and cultural affinities undoubtedly reduce the spatial 
distance between the Scotland and the US.   
 
Figure 2  Scotlands top-ten export markets by percentage of total Scottish exports, 2018 
 
 
Source: Scottish Government 2018a 
 
It is worth exploring whether Scotland is dependent on a comparatively select number of foreign 
markets. Figure 3 illustrates the export composition over time for leading, top-five, top-ten, and 
top-20 export markets. As discussed above, the leading market has remained the US and has 
accounted for approximately a sixth of total Scottish exports for some considerable time. There 
are somewhat noteworthy trends in the remaining three export groupings. Overall, there is a 
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trend towards increased foreign market diversification by Scotlands exporters. Note that the 
top-five, ten, and 20 markets reflect a slight decline over time in overall market concentrations. 
In essence, exports are not as concentrated among leading markets - bar the relative strength of 
the US as a leading export destination - and perhaps show some sign of export market 
diversification. One note of caution should, however, be provided with these findings. Exports 
to countries beyond the top-five to ten markets represent a comparatively small base on which 
to build. Brazil, for example, accounts for only 2.6% of total exports while the 20th-ranked 
market (South Korea), accounts for roughly 1.5%. So, although the apparent geographical 
diffusion of export markets is encouraging, exports to these new and emerging markets remain 
very small (see Slow et al, 2015). This point will be addressed later in the paper. 
 
Figure 3  Composition of exports: percentage of total exports by leading destinations 
 
 
 
Related to what was discussed regarding Figure 2, many of the leading markets for Scotlands 
exports are located within the EU. The UKs forthcoming departure from the EU is expected to 
have some negative impact on this, barring some sort of free trade area being created. While 
this separation is a topic that has already been discussed at length, its full effect on exports 
remain to be seen (Brown et al, 2018). As such, Figure 4 presents a comparison of EU versus 
non-EU export composition. Note that well over a decade ago, non-EU exports surpassed those 
Economic Commentary, September 2018   30 
 
destined to the EU. There are numerous reasons for this changing spatial pattern, some of which 
can be attributed to the aforementioned decline of Scotlands electronics sectors and their 
connections to European supply chains. Indeed, much of the foreign-owned electronics sector 
specifically located in Scotland to target exports to the EU (Raines et al, 2001).   
 
 Figure 4  Composition of exports: EU versus non-EU 
 
 
Source: Scottish Government 2018a; Calculations by Authors 
 
With the decline of the electronics industry the trends clearly illustrate that there is a decreasing 
dependence on European markets for Scotlands exports. These findings are not presented to 
diminish the importance of EU markets to Scottish exporters, but rather to further illustrate a 
changing geography of exports from Scotland. And, far from providing conclusions, this raises 
additional questions about the strategies that firms are using to enter these new markets. 
How do the geographies of Scottish exports fare as a whole? Table 1 shows the worlds largest 
economies in terms of how these relate to Scottish exports. As mentioned in the discussions 
from Figures 2 and 4, the US remains the worlds largest economy as well as the largest single 
destination for exports from Scotland. Additionally, Germany and France are the fourth and fifth 
leading export destinations, respectively. All three of these examples follow some sort of logic 
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in terms of export geography. In the case of the US, historic trading links and the size of the 
market are natural draws. In the case of Germany and France, geographical proximity and EU 
membership are conducive to trade.  
 
Table 1 Worlds largest economies* in terms of Scottish export destinations 
Country Export Destination Rank 2016 Percentage of Exports 2016 
United States 1 16.0 
China 17 1.9 
Japan 19 1.5 
Germany 4 6.4 
France 3 6.6 
India 26 0.9 
Brazil 10 2.6 
Italy 12 2.4 
Canada 15 2.1 
South Korea 20 1.5 
* Excluding the United Kingdom 
Source: Scottish Government 2018a; World Bank 2018b; Calculations by Authors 
 
Beyond these examples, however, the list does not match as well. The worlds second and third-
largest economies, China and Japan, rank as only the 17th and 19th largest as Scottish export 
destinations, with India ranking at 26th and accounting for less than one percent of Scottish 
exports. While each of the large (and relatively un-accessed) economies is unique in terms of 
export suitability, the point remains that there are a number of large and rapidly growing markets 
open to development by Scottish firms. Moreover, locations such as South Korea and Japan are 
well-developed markets with affluent consumer and industrial bases and both China and India 
have experienced rapid economic growth with the emergence of sizeable middle classes. The 
challenge then is to determine what barriers  in other words, what forms of distance  prevent  
Scottish exporters from accessing and potentially benefitting from such large and/or growing 
markets.  
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III  Scottish SMEs and exports 
The data presented above referred to Scottish exporters as a whole. We now turn to the export 
patterns of a particularly important cohort of firms: small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). 
Smaller firms and their export dynamics have been at the centre of much academic and policy-
led research over the past three decades, with much of this centreing on the difficulties that 
SMEs face in international markets (vis-à-vis larger firms) and the resulting export performance 
of these firms (Wright et al, 2007). Nonetheless, with SMEs accounting for more 99% of all firms 
in Scotland, the export performance of such firms is a highly topical issue (Nesta, 2017). This 
section takes a brief look at SME export performance in Scotland, based on 2015-2017 survey 
data from BDRC Continentals Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprise Finance Monitor (2018). 
Notably, just under 10% of the 3,841 SMEs based in Scotland indicated that they  exported. 
While the export-related questions in this survey were somewhat limited (as the study focused 
largely on finance-related issues), the remainder of the analyses will look at the export 
performance of these 375 internationally-engaged Scottish SMEs.  
As seen in Figure 5, over 60% of the surveyed SME exporters derive less than a quarter of their 
total sales from international markets. This is set against less than 20% of these SMEs earning 
more than half of their total turnover from exports. This export performance (or as some would 
posit, underperformance) is in line with all UK SMEs participating in the same survey. While 
these data are not surprising, they do suggest that there is room to grow in terms of export 
expansion for Scottish SMEs. As usual, however, the relevant issue is how to stimulate such 
export growth. 
Related to this export performance and the need to grow markets is the forthcoming UK 
withdrawal from the EU. In light of this, Figure 6 offers results of the survey questions concerning 
a firms approximate export composition concerning the EU. At this point, roughly 65% of the 
firms either do not export to the EU or derive less than half of their export sales from this market. 
So, while some SMEs could be negatively impacted by any loss of barrier-free access to the EU, 
the data suggest that a number of firms are also actively engaging markets outside of this trade 
area.   
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Figure 5  SME export intensity by percentage of total sales by surveyed firms 
 
Source: BDRC Continental (2018) 
 
Figure 6  Breakdown of Scottish SME exports to European Union 
 
Source: BDRC Continental (2018) 
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Although the above data are useful, it is also informative to look at the breakdowns within these 
trade metrics. Table 2 offers a classification of export intensities within the EU export metrics 
discussed in Figure 6. While the results are mixed, a number of noteworthy findings emerge. 
First, SMEs exporting exclusively to the EU also tend to be among those deriving less than a 
quarter of their revenue from exports. Conversely, firms receiving half of their sales from EU 
exports tend to be much more export intensive. Recall that in Figure 6, over 60% of these SMEs 
earned a small portion of their export revenue from the EU or did not engage with this market. 
This group of the firms also tended to be far more export intensive overall, lending some support 
to previous findings that firms which engage more distant markets also tend to be better overall 
export performers. 
Table 2  EU breakdown of exports by firm export intensity, percentage of firms 
Destination 25% or less 26 to 50% 51 to 75% 76 to 100% 
Export only to the EU 88.2 11.8 0.0 0.0 
Majority of exports to the EU 66.7 18.5 7.4 7.4 
Half of exports to EU 41.7 37.5 20.8 0.0 
Minority of exports to EU 71.0 14.0 8.4 6.5 
Do not export to EU 80.6 3.2 12.9 3.2 
Source: BDRC Continental (2018). Calculations by authors 
 
Table 3  International market expansion and export intensity, percentage of firms 
  Planning to move into new markets abroad? 
Export intensity Yes No 
25% or less 21.5 78.5 
26 to 50% 40.9 59.1 
51 to 75% 47.8 52.2 
76 to 100% 43.8 56.3 
All firms 29.0 71.0 
Source: BDRC Continental (2018). Calculations by authors 
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Table 4  International market expansion and European Union export breakdown (percentage of 
firms) 
  Planning to move into new markets abroad? 
Export Composition Yes No 
Export only to the EU 25.0 75.0 
Majority of exports to the EU 40.9 59.1 
Half of exports to EU 36.8 63.2 
Minority of exports to EU 23.2 76.8 
Do not export to EU 29.2 70.8 
Source: BDRC Continental (2018). Calculations by authors 
 
An additional survey question asked whether these firms planned to engage new markets in the 
upcoming year in either the UK or abroad. Table 3 provides a look at the overseas component of 
this question, couched in terms of the export intensities. Perhaps the most interesting and 
somewhat alarming result is that overall, only 29% of the SMEs planned to move into a new 
international market in the next year. In a sense, this does not bode well for the expansion of 
Scottish exports. However, given that over 60% of these firms have export intensities less than 
25%, the results are somewhat skewed by this group of SMEs. On the other hand, firms that are 
more export-intensive (i.e. greater than 25% exports) also tend to be among those showing a 
higher propensity to engage with a new international market. In each export grouping, note that 
at least 40% indicated that they would do so. The new market question was also juxtaposed 
with the EU export market question, as seen in Table 4. While the results are somewhat varied, 
it is important to note that for firms with a majority of exports destined to the EU, fully two-fifths 
intend to engage with a new international market  the highest number among these groupings. 
This would suggest that such firms are looking to diversify their export market portfolio in a time 
of relative economic uncertainty. 
 
IV  Looking ahead: increasing trade development in the post-Brexit era  
This paper has shown that Scotland faces an export deficit compared to the rest of the UK as a 
whole. Scottish SMEs seem especially internally focused: only a small minority export and the 
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majority derive less than a quarter of their total sales from international markets. Addressing 
these complex challenges is exacerbated by the complex operating environment confronting 
firms at the present time, especially related to Brexit-induced uncertainty and the wider hostile 
international trading environment since the election of the Trump administration in the US.   
What this suggests is that policymakers may have to become much more proactive to alleviate 
these challenges if Scotland is to overcome this export deficit and stimulate export expansion 
among SMEs.  To achieve this, the Scottish Government may wish to further prioritise overseas 
internationalisation over other (often more resource-intensive) economic development 
initiatives such as infrastructure or flagship higher education commercialization efforts (Brown 
et al, 2016). The key benefit from concentrating support towards SME internationalisation owes 
to the fact that many externally-focused SMEs are often the most growth-focused firms which 
generate substantial economic benefits for local economies, most notably jobs (Mason and 
Brown, 2013).   
While Scotland underperforms in terms of exporting, there also seems to be a strong recognition 
that the UKs export performance as a whole underperforms relative to its European peers. In 
terms of longer-term strategic forms of assistance to encourage SME internationalisation, policy 
makers may have to implement a much more expansive and well-resourced overarching export 
strategy for Scotland. Indeed, the UK government is currently developing a new export strategy 
to build on the recent economic strategy Building our Industrial Strategy (BEIS, 2017). A key 
starting point within this work is the acknowledgement that while less than one in ten UK SMEs 
currently exports, almost the same number (an estimated 300,000 SMEs) have the capacity to 
internationalise. This would suggest that roughly 30,000 Scottish SMEs may have some kind of 
capacity to become internationalised. Targeting such dormant or discouraged exporters 
seems to be a highly worthwhile policy objective.    
In view of the need for more firms to engage with international markets, what type of initiatives 
could (or should) be developed to encourage exporting, especially among SMEs? The first policy 
task is to motivate non-exporters (or infrequent exporters) to explore international markets. This 
may be easier said than done. The export challenge is especially salient for SMEs, due to 
challenges such as limited capital for exploring international markets (whether in terms of onsite 
visits or trade fairs), obtaining export market intelligence, or even securing the capital to expand 
production for export sales. Organisations such as Scottish Development International have 
been developing programmes for years on this front. Perhaps more could be done to encourage 
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SMEs to take the initial foray into global markets. Export initiatives such as the TR&DE program 
by the former UKTI have worked in various locations to provide seed funding for SMEs to explore 
international markets (Kalafsky, 2017). Other development-trade organisations have 
encouraged (and helped to fund) SMEs to attend trade fairs as vehicles to access a wider 
international customer base. Regardless, taking the initial leap into international markets is an 
important first step. 
Just as important is the need to encourage SMEs to persevere when export markets do not work 
out well the first time. Many firms become discouraged after initial export explorations do not 
turn out as planned. So in addition to helping non-exporters to export, policymakers and trade 
development officials could look for ways in which to support SMEs that have lower export 
intensities or have pulled back from international markets altogether due to previous negative 
experiences. 
 A second equally important policy challenge concerns the geographies of export markets. 
Simply put, are there policy-led means to catalyse firms to explore new and/or emerging markets 
that are not currently served by most Scottish exporters? As discussed earlier in this paper, 
almost one-sixth of Scottish exports are destined for the US alone, with concentrations in nearby 
European markets. Moreover, the data in this paper suggests that many large and/or emerging 
global markets receive relatively little attention from Scottish exporters. Beyond the initial jump 
to exporting discussed above, how do firms engage with new markets? This again is a question 
of supporting firms (especially SMEs) in terms of obtaining intelligence of international markets. 
Beyond standard prescriptions and information sources such as these, again it may entail 
actively motivating promising exporters to go to faraway locations. Firms can attend trade fairs 
located domestically or internationally to find these customers. While the trade fair solution is 
a possibility, it is not always within the realm of possibilities for many firms. Indeed, SMEs have 
cited the costs of participating in trade fairs as an impediment to exporting (Kalafsky and 
Duggan, 2016). While trade fairs and the like may indeed be the cost of doing business in 
international space, perhaps greater levels of incentives could be offered to help leverage 
access into new and emerging markets.  
Of course, a critical factor shaping the current exporting environment is the indeterminate nature 
of Brexit. Brexit is so polyvalent, pervasive, and entrenched across so many sectors it is difficult 
to exaggerate its potential impact.  Research strongly shows that Scottish firms, especially 
Scottish SMEs, are deeply concerned about the potential negative impact of Brexit. Compared 
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to other parts of the UK, Scottish and Northern Irish SMEs note particularly strong concerns 
about Brexit (Brown et al, 2018). While examining the policy implications of Brexit is well beyond 
the scope of this paper, what seems certain is that Brexit is likely to have a profound impact on 
the trading environment facing Scottish firms for years to come.   
Taken in one sense, it can be (and for the most part has been) viewed as an existential threat for 
Scotlands exporters in view of the fact SMEs typically engage with comparatively nearby or 
adjacent EU markets. In this regard, this could be problematic as there is often a considerable 
lead time needed to successfully engage international markets, especially those in which the 
firm has little or no experience. On the other hand, viewed more optimistically, it could be an 
opportunity for Scottish exporters. If indeed the UK is no longer joined in some sort of common 
market or free trade area (which is still in flux), then firms may be compelled to find new and in 
most cases, distant, markets. At the same time, the distance of such markets might be 
manifested in various ways: cultural, regulatory, and other ways beyond mere geography. In 
particular, this is an area in which policy-led support could help the most in terms of gathering 
market intelligence and easing the difficulties of entering a market. 
That said, irrespective of the outcome of the Brexit process, neighbouring EU markets will remain 
critical for the Scottish economy. Therefore, alleviating the negative impact of Brexit is crucial 
for enhancing the long-term competitiveness of many export-oriented Scottish SMEs.  Positively, 
this has been recognised by the Scottish Government who have been one of the first devolved 
administrations to proactively offer a bespoke Brexit-related subsidy to SMEs exporters to the 
EU2.  
Commendably, the Scottish Government recently created a new bespoke ministerial portfolio 
specifically designed to assist the development of Scotlands wider trade-related efforts and to 
cultivate associated political and commercial interests overseas. This is an important step in the 
right direction towards nurturing a stronger policy focus on improving Scotlands weak export 
performance.  However, part of the problem facing policy makers is a lack of concrete evidence 
on how best to develop international trade.  Therefore, undertaking an enquiry (similar to the 
famous 1990s  Business Birth Rate Enquiry) around exports might be a useful step towards 
enhancing the evidence base around the underlying causal factors contributing to Scotlands 
                                                                
2The pilot scheme launched in Scotland enables eligible SMEs a subsidy of £4,000 to assist with exporting to EU markets. Details 
of the scheme appear at: https://news.gov.scot/news/preparing-business-for-brexit  
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historical export underperformance. More immediately, what seems certain is that policymakers 
are likely to have to provide an important cushion against the arduous Brexit headwinds facing 
Scottish exporters, especially if the countrys weak export performance is to be improved in the 
years to come.      
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Monetary and fiscal policy in a newly independent 
Scotland: lessons from the dissolution of 
Czechoslovakia? 
Frantisek Brocek, Department of Economics, University of Strathclyde 
 
Abstract: This paper looks at the creation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia and its 
transitionary monetary union to illustrate the challenges - and opportunities - that a newly 
independent Scotland might face. The paper provides a background to the economic 
consequences of the dissolution on both the Czech Republic and Slovakia, their divergent paths 
in terms of economic policy and growth and the reasons why their monetary union was short-
lived. The lessons from this experience are then drawn with regard to the issues that might face 
a newly independent Scotland, were policy to follow the recommendations of the recent 
Sustainable Growth Commission report. Though not strict parallels, the economic experience of 
the dissolution of Czechoslovakia does have some lessons for a newly independent Scotland to 
consider.  
    
I Introduction 
The recent Sustainable Growth Commission report sets out the vision that Scotland could retain 
the pound sterling for an extended transition period after Scotland gains political independence 
from the UK.  Clearly, retaining the pound post-independence would reduce transaction costs 
such as the costs of currency conversion or the need for businesses to revalue their assets and 
liabilities. Furthermore, it could help reduce exchange rate uncertainty and help ensure that 
business and consumer confidence remains in place immediately after independence. However, 
the question of whether there would be fiscal and macroeconomic tensions between Scotland 
and rUK post-independence would be crucial for the sustainability of any transitionary monetary 
union. There are few international case studies that can be used to judge the success or 
otherwise of monetary union between two countries. An interesting example is the dissolution 
of Czechoslovakia in 1993 and the monetary arrangements that followed. The creation of the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia is sometimes referred to as the two-step break up, as it involved 
first the political creation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia on 1st January 1993 and a 
subsequent creation of an independent monetary position 38 days later on 8th February 1993. 
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This paper discusses the background of how the Czechoslovak transitory monetary union was 
formed, its fiscal implications, how the monetary union ended, and how the two countries fared 
in the years afterwards.  This paper will also discuss the main lessons for a newly independent 
Scotland, such as the importance of expectations of financial markets and the need for 
symmetric macroeconomic developments with the rest of the UK for the sustainability of a 
transitory monetary union.  
 
II The Czechoslovak transitionary monetary union 
The federal state of Czechoslovakia was a twentieth century construct and dates back to 1918 
when it was created in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. During 
the Second World War, the state split with the First Slovak Republic created as a satellite state 
of Germany, with limited sovereignty. Subsequent seizure of power by the Communist Party of 
Czechoslovakia after WWII led to the reunification of Czechoslovakia as a unitary socialist state 
under Soviet influence. During the Prague Spring in 1968 however, the Constitutional Law of 
Federation reinstated Czechoslovakias official federal structure, which promised a common 
state consisting of two equal nations. However, despite its federal structure, the communist 
government concentrated its centralised power and policy-making powers in Prague, which led 
to the build-up of discontent amongst many Slovaks.  
The modern day dissolution of Czechoslovakia was a result of the 1992 parliamentary elections. 
The decision to dissolve Czechoslovakia was taken by then Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus 
and Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, as a political decision without the constitutional 
backdrop of a referendum. At the time, the main points of disagreement between the Czech and 
Slovak governments were the redistribution of power between the federation and constituent 
republics and the design of future reforms. In order to mitigate the immediate negative economic 
effects of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, such as an abrupt decline in bilateral trade or cross-
border investment, the decision was taken to retain a common currency, a customs union, and 
a common labour market. The monetary union would see both countries retain the Czechoslovak 
crown for a period of six months with further extensions to be considered after this period.  
The monetary union agreement stipulated that each side had the option to withdraw from the 
union if: (1) the fiscal deficit of either country exceeded 10%; (2) foreign exchange reserves in 
either country fell below one months worth of its imports; (3) inter-country capital transfers 
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exceeded 5% of total bank deposits; (4) the Monetary Policy Committee was unable to reach 
agreement on fundamental monetary policy issues (Fidrmuc, Horvath, and Fidrmuc, 1999). The 
former monetary policy authority, the State Bank of Czechoslovakia (SBCS), was replaced by an 
independent central bank for each country and a joint monetary board was established with a 
50:50 representation from each central bank to take decisions on joint monetary policy.  
 
III Fiscal implications of the monetary union and independence 
It is hard to judge the immediate fiscal impact of the monetary union on both countries 
economies due to its (very) short-lived existence. However, post the ending of the monetary 
union in February 1993, both the Czech Republic and Slovakia experienced a recession with 
Czech GDP falling by 1% and Slovak GDP falling by 4% (Fidrmuc, Horvath, and Fidrmuc, 1999). 
To a large degree, this was a reform-induced recession associated with the transition from 
centrally planned economies to free-market economies. The contraction in GDP could have also 
been partly induced by the after-effects of the 1991 global recession. Nevertheless, the costs 
associated with building new institutions, the decrease in mutual trade, and the cessation of 
any fiscal transfers between the two countries also contributed to the deepening of the 
recession. According to Sujan and Sujanova (1994), the overall costs associated with the 
dissolution were 2.1% of Czech and 5.7% of Slovak GDP.  
The liabilities of the federal state, such as banknotes, commercial bank reserves held by the 
federal central bank, and debt obligations towards the IMF, were divided 2:1 according to the 
population ratio between the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Immovable assets were taken over 
by the country where they were located with all other assets being divided by their population 
ratio. Throughout the post-war history of Czechoslovakia, Slovakia had consistently been a net 
recipient of fiscal transfers from the Czech Republic. The estimates of the size of the net fiscal 
transfer in 1992 vary in size from 13.5 billion Czechoslovak crowns (CSK) (Hajek et al., 1993) to 
CSK 25 billion (OECD, 1994), equivalent to between 4.4% and 8% of Slovak GDP. Given the non-
zero sum nature of the fiscal transfers, with the dissolution of Czechoslovakia the Czech 
Republic gained and Slovakia lost the value of the implicit liability to continue these fiscal 
transfers into the future. 
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IV The ending of the Czech / Slovak monetary union 
The abrupt ending of the Czech / Slovak monetary union was associated with underlying and 
long-term structural tensions between the countries economies and immediate developments 
around the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. Firstly, the monetary union and the Czechoslovak 
crown failed to achieve credibility in the financial markets.  The newly-established joint 
monetary committee was comprised of the governors and two senior officials from each central 
bank. However, as the markets correctly anticipated, the countries divergence in 
macroeconomic variables such as unemployment and GDP growth before and after the 
dissolution of Czechoslovakia made decisions in pursuit of the common interests of the single 
currency impossible. Higher unemployment and weaker growth meant that Slovak authorities 
were in favour of lower interest rates and competitive devaluation of the Czechoslovak crown, 
whereas this was clearly not in the best interest of their Czech counterparts. Although the 
decisions on monetary policy were made by the joint monetary committee, the implementation 
of policy decisions was left to the national central banks. This contributed to a dysfunctional 
institutional design for conducting monetary policy and led to an undermining of the 
Czechoslovak crowns credibility on financial markets. 
This lack of credibility was expressed in a parallel exchange rate of the Czechoslovak crown 
relative to the US dollar (i.e. the exchange rate quoted by commercial banks) which climbed to 
be 78% higher than the official exchange rate (Firdmuc, Horvath, and Fidrmuc, 1999). 
Furthermore, due to the poor competitiveness of the Slovak economy relative to its neighbours, 
a devaluation of the new Slovak crown was expected at the end of the 6-month transition period. 
In anticipation of this, large capital outflows from Slovak to Czech banks occurred in late 1992 
and at the beginning of 1993. Furthermore, Slovak importers sought to repay their debts as soon 
as possible, while Czech importers wanted the exact opposite. The gradual outflow of currency 
from Slovakia to the Czech Republic further worsened the tensions associated with the single 
currency, as Slovak banks were prone to significant reductions in their liquidity3 which 
threatened to force them into insolvency, were no government action taken.  
                                                                
3 The impact of severe decline in back liquidity, such as in the 2008 banking crisis, demonstrate the severely destabilising effects 
for the real economy. 
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A single currency maximises economic efficiency if the region where it is used is an optimum 
currency area4. The Czechoslovak experience suggests that the two countries were not an 
optimum currency area and that there were several asymmetric developments in the two 
economies. Optimum currency area literature argues that labour mobility is a key adjustment 
mechanism in the event of asymmetric shocks (Mundell, 1961). In the event of an asymmetric 
shock, such as a decrease in demand for goods in a country, high labour mobility can bring the 
goods market back into equilibrium by workers migrating to another country and reducing the 
natural rate of unemployment in the domestic country. However, if labour mobility is low, the 
adjustment must come through higher prices and lower wages.  The data from Czech Republic 
and Slovakia suggests that there was a low degree of inter-regional / inter-country labour 
mobility. This magnified the pre-existing, pre-dissolution macroeconomic impacts of the 
differences in unemployment rates between the two countries. In December 1992, the 
unemployment rate was 2.6% in the Czech Republic and 10.4% in Slovakia. Close to a year after 
the dissolution, in December 1993, the difference had increased even further; Czech 
unemployment increased to 3.5% and the Slovak rate increased to 14.4% (Fidrmuc, Horvath, 
and Fidrmuc, 1999).  
Industry specialisation and the synchronisation of business cycles are also important factors for 
a successful optimum currency area. The incidence of asymmetric shocks is much smaller in a 
diversified economy than in a specialised one. In the case of Slovakia, most of its industry was 
built in the period after the 1948 communist takeover with a focus on heavy engineering, 
metallurgy, and the chemical industry (Pavlinek, 1995). The communist political objectives were 
also mirrored in the reliance on the military equipment industry where a substantial amount of 
exports was directed to the former Soviet bloc. On the other hand, Czech industry was more 
diversified and focused on high value-added sectors. The reliance of Slovakia on heavy and 
military industries may have amplified the asymmetric shocks which in turn contributed to the 
collapse of the monetary union. 
                                                                
4 The theory of optimum currency area was first introduced by Mundell (1961) and shows that countries should join a monetary 
union if the costs of doing so are lower than the benefits. The four main criteria for a region to form an optimum currency area are: 
(1) an integrated labour market where labour can move freely, (2) flexibility of pricing and wages, along with mobility of capital, (3) 
A redistribution mechanism to redistribute capital to parts of the area that have suffered because of labour and capital mobility, 
(4) a synchronisation of business cycles between the participating regions or countries. 
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A lower correlation of permanent output shocks (i.e. long-term trends in GDP growth between 
the two countries) can be a destabilising factor for a currency union. If countries in a currency 
union do not have synchronised business cycles the central bank will struggle to offset 
economic recessions and contain inflation for the whole area. Data suggests that the correlation 
of permanent output shocks between the Czech Republic and Slovakia ranged from 0.34 and 
0.53 for different time periods between 1948 to 1990 (Fidrmuc, Horvath, Fidrmuc, 1999). This 
was much lower than other monetary unions such as the US, where the correlation of permanent 
output shocks ranged from 0.69 to 0.86 (Fidrmuc, Horvath, Fidrmuc, 1999). These developments 
suggest that the monetary union was experiencing structural tensions throughout its history that 
were further amplified after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. These factors created 
macroeconomic imbalances which it is argued contributed to the collapse of the post-
dissolution transitionary monetary union.  
 
V The path from monetary union to the Eurozone 
The fortunes of Slovakia and the Czech Republic after dissolution were very different in the 
1990s. The Czech Republic pursued a path of reform and market liberalisation that led it to 
achieve economic success in the late 1990s, while Slovakia remained stuck in a period of 
secular stagnation with a government led by Prime Minister Meciar which had no enthusiasm for 
reforms. Despite averaging economic growth of 6% between 1994 and 1996 and over 4% until 
1998, the Slovak economy remained fragile and on an unsustainable path (uster, 2004). The 
output gap created by the 1991 recession was finally overhauled by 1996, but growth was 
fuelled mainly by expansionary fiscal policy (uster, 2004). As expected, this expansionary 
fiscal policy was associated with a high government deficit (4.7% in 1998) and a build-up in 
government debt (28.9% of GDP in 1998, up from 11.5% in 1996). Long-term unemployment 
continued to grow with the unemployment rate reaching a high of 15.6% in 1998 (uster, 2004). 
After the 1998 election a reformist government took power and started to modernise the Slovak 
economy. Bold free market reforms and fiscal policies aimed at stabilising government debt to 
fulfil the Maastricht criteria enabled the start of Slovakias entry to European Union (EU) in 2004. 
Subsequently, tax breaks and tariff breaks, subsidies for new employment and government 
commitments to build infrastructure were made. This helped draw in foreign direct investment 
(FDI), particularly into the car industry.  This significant increase in FDI contributed to Slovakia 
posting the fastest economic growth in Central Europe with it being nicknamed the Tatra Tiger. 
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During its entry into the EU, Slovakia committed to adopt the Euro once it had fulfilled the 
conditions set out in the Maastricht Treaty. Market-induced reforms of the early 2000s changed 
the structure of the Slovak economy and enabled convergence in macroeconomic variables 
towards the EU average. During the transition period, agriculture and industry, lost a great deal 
of their share of the economy, while services gained significantly (National Bank of Slovakia, 
2003). The reforms and transformation of the Slovak economy enabled the country to join the 
Eurozone in 2009. Zudel and Melioris (2016) estimated that by adopting the Euro, Slovakia 
gained a 10% boost in real GDP per capita by 2011. The benefits came mainly from the reduction 
in transaction and administrative costs and an increase in FDI and trade with key partners such 
as Germany.  
In 2004, both the Czech Republic and Slovakia joined the EU, but the Czech Republic decided 
not to adopt the Euro. The decision was a policy choice of Czech government and was based on 
the backdrop of beliefs by the Czech National Bank that real economic convergence towards the 
Euro area in areas such as price stability and industry specialisation had not been sufficient 
(MoF CZ and CNB, 2017). As shown in the chart below, in the years immediately after the 
adoption of the Euro, Slovakia achieved higher GDP growth than the Czech Republic. Despite 
other factors (e.g. public spending providing a boost to aggregate demand) which could have 
contributed to this difference, it is clear that Slovakia benefited from adopting the Euro. 
In 2004, both the Czech Republic and Slovakia joined the EU, but the Czech Republic decided 
not to adopt the Euro. The decision was a policy choice of Czech government and was based on 
the backdrop of beliefs by the Czech National Bank that real economic convergence towards the 
Euro area in areas such as price stability and industry specialisation had not been sufficient 
(MoF CZ and CNB, 2017). As shown in Figure 1, in the years immediately after the adoption of 
the Euro, Slovakia achieved higher GDP growth than the Czech Republic. Despite other factors 
(e.g. public spending providing a boost to aggregate demand) which could have contributed to 
this difference, it is clear that Slovakia benefited from adopting the Euro. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Real GDP growth rate in Czech Republic and Slovakia 
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Source: Eurostat 
 
 
VI The Sustainable Growth Commission and the Scottish context 
The Sustainable Growth Commission (2018) report suggests that a newly independent Scotland 
would need to achieve a substantial reduction in in its fiscal deficit to gain credibility in the 
markets and at that point it could make an orderly transition to a new currency.  
The report suggests that Scotland retains the pound sterling for an extended period after any 
vote for independence. During this period Scotland would face an interest rate regime set by the 
Bank of England. The Sustainable Growth Commission suggests that after the transition period 
Scotland would establish its own new currency. The report offers a roadmap and sets out plans 
for financial regulation, banking, and the creation of a Scottish Central Bank (Sustainable 
Growth Commission. 2018). The Czechoslovak experience shows that if two newly independent 
countries face one interest rate, but their economies start diverging in terms of macroeconomic 
variables (e.g. GDP growth, inflation, unemployment, fiscal deficit) the central bank might find 
it difficult to set an interest rate which will be suitable for economic conditions in both countries.  
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Scotland and the UK outside of London, share broadly similar characteristics. Key economic 
indices for Scotland tend to be similar to the UK average, albeit the London-effect does pull the 
UK number higher. The structure of the two economies are more similar than in the Czech and 
Slovak case, although the existence of oil in the Scottish economy is one key difference. 
However, whilst there may be economic similarities, the Czechoslovak case highlights how any 
meaningful differences, whether at the outset of independence or building up over time, have 
the potential to unsettle the underlying monetary union. Indeed, if the very purpose of 
independence is to build a different economy to the UK, then it necessarily follows that the 
system will become less stable.  
As highlighted earlier, Slovakia was a net recipient of fiscal transfers before 1993, with 
estimates of the size of the transfer varying from between 4.4% to 8% of GDP.  
The Sustainable Growth Commission (2018) concedes that a newly independent Scotland would 
inherit a substantial fiscal deficit of circa 6% of GDP and it sets out a plan for reducing the deficit 
over a 10-year period. However, any new Scottish currency would need to gain credibility in the 
financial markets on the day after independence. Given an expected fiscal deficit of such a scale, 
there is a risk that financial markets could put the new Scottish currency under substantial 
pressure.  
 
VII Conclusions 
The story of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia shows that transitionary monetary unions can be, 
depending on pre-existing circumstance, unstable. The main economic factors that led to the 
collapse of the Czechoslovak currency union were a low correlation of permanent output shocks, 
low labour mobility and a mismatched industrial composition (e.g. a higher concentration of 
heavy and military industries in Slovakia compared to the Czech Republic). A dysfunctional 
institutional design for monetary policy and pressure from the financial markets led to the rapid 
collapse of the Czechoslovak crown. Despite the fact that the Czechoslovak experience is an 
interesting case study of the feasibility of a monetary union after the split of two countries, it 
does need to be viewed within a wider economic, political and social context.  
It needs to be remembered that the Czech Republic and Slovakia were centrally planned 
economies for over 40 years prior to their attempt at sustaining a monetary union. Transition 
economies of such nature face many structural issues which the UK and Scotland simply would 
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not, given over 300 years of political union and over 100 years of democracy and stable 
institutions. The path of market liberalisation and reforms after the monetary union collapsed 
led to faster growth in the Czech Republic relative to Slovakia. It was only with radical reforms in 
the early 2000s that led Slovakia to become the Tatra Tiger. The sustained convergence in 
macroeconomic variables towards the EU average allowed the country to complete its successful 
entry into the EU in 2004 and into the Eurozone in 2009, which have underpinned Slovakias 
success story to date. 
The Czechoslovak monetary union experiment shows that even small structural differences 
between two economies can make them more vulnerable to asymmetric shocks and will make 
the creation of a stable optimal currency area difficult.  If Scotland was to remain part of the 
Common Travel Area, high labour mobility between Scotland and the rest of the UK could act as 
an adjustment mechanism to offset some of any macroeconomic imbalances.  
Whatever decision is taken however, perhaps the most significant lesson is that the 
expectations and behaviour of financial markets  like it or not  need to be borne in mind at all 
times. This will be true whether trying to maintain a monetary union or introducing a new Scottish 
currency.  
In summary, the Czechoslovak experience shows that the post-independence transitionary 
monetary union proposed by the Sustainable Growth Commission in Scotland could face 
challenges. At the same time however, the Slovak experience shows that with the right mix of 
institutional reforms accompanied with membership of the EU and Eurozone, there is a route to 
economic growth and increases in living standards. 
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Abstract 
The wider impacts of energy policy on the macro-economy are increasingly recognised in the 
academic and policy-oriented literature. Given the interdependence of energy and the wider 
economy, any economic policy change will impact on the energy system. However, such 
spillovers on the energy system have not been extensively researched. This article analyses the 
impact of export promotion policies - a key element of the UKs Industrial Strategy - on the energy 
system and energy policy goals. As the impacts of such policies are, in large part, transmitted 
via their effects on the economy, we use a computable general equilibrium model - UK-ENVI  to 
fully capture impact. Our results suggest that an across-the-board stimulus to exports 
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significantly increases total energy use, not directly via energy exports but indirectly via linkages 
between the energy sector and other sectors. We show that export-led growth has significant 
impacts on energy use and, in turn, on emission targets. Policy makers need to be aware that 
the successful implementation of the UK Industrial Strategy may create significant tensions with 
the UKs Clean Growth Strategy and wider energy policy goals. The scale of such impacts depend 
upon both the mix of UK goods and services exports and the success of low-carbon policies. A 
knowledge of the nature and scale of the spillover effects of economic policies on the energy 
system provides a platform for more effective and efficient policy making. 
1. Introduction 
The wider impacts of energy policy on the macro-economy are increasingly recognised in the 
academic and policy-oriented literatures. Within policy communities there is a developing 
recognition that the wider impacts of energy efficiency policies should be taken into account as 
proposed in the multiple benefits approach of the International Energy Agency (2015), rather 
than focussing exclusively per se on energy (and emissions) savings.  
Indeed, some governments emphasise energy efficiency improvements explicitly as economic 
development policies (e.g. the Scottish Government, 2017), as well as a potential source of 
energy savings. Of course, these developments reflect the fundamental interdependence of 
energy (and emissions) and the economy: policy actions in any one system generate spillover 
effects in the other. Neglect of this interdependence may prove problematic for policy.  
The interdependence of the energy systems and the economy naturally also implies that any 
changes in the economy impact on the energy system. The experience of the Great Recession, 
for example, provides dramatic evidence of such dependence, with total UK energy consumption 
falling by over 6% between 2008 and 2009 when the UK economy contracted by around 4% 
(BEIS, 2017a). However, these spillovers are not necessarily negative, and double dividends 
(or even multiple benefits) are possible, where policies simultaneously stimulate economic 
activity and reduce emissions (and potentially also contribute to other policy goals).  
While this interdependence is, of course, widely recognised, it has not featured prominently in 
assessing the likely impact of economic policies, such as industrial and fiscal policies: such 
assessments have tended to focus on the primary economic objectives of such policies, 
including their impact on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employment.  
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In principle, (non-energy) economic policies are likely to have a significant influence on the 
energy system, the neglect of which may lead to inefficiencies in the design of appropriate 
energy and economic policies. The importance of this in practice depends on the strength of the 
interdependencies between both systems and, in particular, the scale of the impact of economic 
on energy policy goals.  
Our primary focus is on the comparatively unexplored impacts of economic policies on the 
energy system and their effects on energy policy goals such as energy use (and emissions), 
energy intensity and energy security. However, the impacts of such policies are, in large part, 
transmitted via their impact on the economic system, so that we have to adopt an approach that 
fully captures such interdependence.  
In this article we analyse the potential impacts of successful UK industrial, business and 
innovation policy on the UK economic and energy systems, as well as the corresponding energy 
policy goals. Two key pillars of the UK Industrial Strategy are concerned with encouraging trade 
and boosting productivity (BEIS, 2017b). Although trading more, not less seems to be key, 
precise policies or quantifiable measures are not explicitly stated5. Despite being concerned 
with coordinating policy, the strategy does not consider explicitly trade-offs (or 
complementarities) across policies, and how such tensions and conflicting demands could be 
overcome. As we illustrate in analytical and empirical analysis, increasing trade has a significant 
impact on the energy system, and energy policy goals in particular. This analysis therefore has 
two objectives; first, to explore how economic policies impact the energy system, and, second, 
to demonstrate the potential usefulness of the CGE modelling approach in capturing and 
quantifying the interdependencies between the economy and energy systems. 
Here we analyse the system-wide effects of successful export strategies on the economy and the 
energy system. As part of a UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC) project we are also investigating 
the the economic impacts of UK labour productivity-enhancing industrial policies and their 
spillover effects on the energy system, and the impacts of UK (and Scottish) fiscal policies on 
the energy system, which we shall publish in due course. 
                                                                
5 Although the recently published UK Export Strategy (DIT, 2018) now sets a target to raising exports as a proportion of GDP from 
30% to 35%. We shall explore in future the system-wide implications of reaching this target. However, the Export Strategy 
currently does not provide detail on the precise policy instruments used. 
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We employ a multi-sectoral computable general equilibrium (CGE) approach which captures the 
interdependence of the economy and energy systems and allows us automatically to track the 
impact of key energy and economic policy interventions on the main goals of both sets of 
policies and so can be used ultimately to develop a more holistic perspective on the conduct of 
policy. In particular, the intention is ultimately to create a framework that explicitly recognises, 
and seeks to quantify, the scale of spillovers from economic and energy policies to energy and 
economic policy goals respectively. Where these spillovers prove to be significant, accounting 
for them through better coordination of economic and energy policies would create the potential 
to deliver improved outcomes for both. 
This article is organised as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of our energy-economy-
environment model of the UK economy, and the simulation strategy. We present results in 
Section 3, and brief conclusions in Section 4.  
2. Model and simulation strategy 
In practice it seems likely that the Export Strategy will involve sectoral targeting of export 
promotion and this could have a significant influence on the impact on both the economic and 
energy sub-systems. However, since at the time of writing these sectors have not been identified 
explicitly, we focus here on an across-the-board stimulus. Such stimulus would increase exports 
as a proportion of GDP, which is currently an explicit target within the strategy. Accordingly, for 
now we proxy the impact of a successful trade-enhancing policies by an exogenous (and 
costless) 5% increase in international export demands across all sectors. 
We simulate the economic and energy system impacts of such an increase in international 
export demands using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the UK, UK-ENVI. Ross 
et al., (2018) provide a detailed description of the main characteristics of the model, with a 
particular emphasis on the linkages between the economic and energy sub-sectors, and a full 
mathematical account of the model.   
For our analysis, however, it is important to note that we consider a number of alternative labour 
market closures, so as to reflect alternative visions of how the UK labour market operates. We 
do this for two main reasons. First, there exists genuine uncertainty about the way that the 
aggregate UK labour market currently operates and there has been considerable controversy 
surrounding the issue (e.g. Bell & Blanchflower, 2018). Secondly, we wish to check the extent 
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to which spillovers from economic policies to the energy system vary with alternative visions of 
UK labour market behaviour. This allows us, as far as is practical within the UK-ENVI model, to 
check that our conclusions are robust with respect to the choice of any particular model of the 
UK labour market. 
2.1. The labour market 
Our default model specification embodies a wage curve which reflects an inverse relation 
between the rate of unemployment and the real wage. Wages are thereby determined within the 
UK in an imperfectly competitive context, according to the following bargained real wage (BRW) 
specification:  
 ln ln( )t t
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U Hª º  « »¬ ¼
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wb W   (1) 
In equation 1, /t tw cpi  is the real take home wage, U is a parameter calibrated to the steady 
state, H is the elasticity of wage related to the level of unemployment, tu , and tW  is the income 
tax rate. So here the real consumption (after tax) wage is negatively related to the rate of 
unemployment (Blanchflower & Oswald, 2005), which is an indicator of workers bargaining 
power. 
The working population is assumed to be fixed and exogenous. This model implies the presence 
of involuntary unemployment (with BRW lying above the competitive supply curve for labour).  
Conventional CGEs of national economies often make the simplifying assumption of an entirely 
exogenous labour supply (with both population and the participation rate invariant): that is 
labour supply exhibits a zero elasticity with respect to the real wage. This exogenous labour 
supply (ELS) vision of the market implies that employment is fixed. 
 Ls Ls    (2) 
Of course, this vision of the labour market implies that the UK operates under a very tight supply 
constraint. Note that, in the short run, both capital and labour are fixed in each sector in this 
case, and so too is value-added. Aggregate GDP can only vary in response to disturbances that 
alter the allocation of activity across sectors. Furthermore, employment is effectively fixed even 
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in the longer-term, and is, of course, invariant to any change in demand, although capital stocks 
can adjust in response to changes in rental rates.6  
Some take the view that workers in the UK bargain to maintain their real wage - real wage 
resistance - that results in a fixed real wage (FRW) model (at least in the absence of productivity 
growth). This model implies:  
 0
0
t t
t t
w w
cpi cpi
 
 
   (3) 
This case effectively implies an infinitely elastic supply of labour over the relevant range. In stark 
contrast to the ELS case, here the real wage is fixed, and any demand disturbances will be 
reflected only in employment changes (over a range).  
The ELS and FRW cases represent limiting cases of the responsiveness of the effective supply of 
labour to the real consumption wage, with elasticities of zero and infinity respectively. The BRW 
case represents an intermediate case in which the effective (bargaining-determined) level of 
employment varies positively with the real consumption wage. 
While these cases provide a useful range of alternative visions of the UK labour market, recent 
experience casts some doubt on the current relevance of the BRW or FRW hypotheses, since real 
wages have been falling despite a fall in the unemployment rate. There is clearly some evidence 
of a degree of nominal wage inflexibility. Here we illustrate the likely implications of this by 
exploring the limiting case of a fixed nominal wage (FNW): 
 0t tw w     (4) 
The next section outlines our simulation results. 
3. Simulation results 
We start by discussing the aggregate long-run results for the FNW-FRW closures since this is a 
useful benchmark, whose properties are well-known (see Ross et al., (2018) for a detailed 
discussion). We then outline the main differences between the FNW-FRW, BRW (our default 
                                                                
6 In the longer-term population and labour supply can, of course, increase through natural population growth. For simplicity we 
abstraction from that here. Migration flows could also alter labour supply, but we assume that net migration is zero here. However, 
the fixed real wage model, discussed below, emulates many of the features of a system with endogenous (flow) migration. 
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model), and ELS closures. This is followed by a detailed discussion of the potential impacts on 
the energy systems, sectoral results, and a discussion of short-run results.  
Table 1: Short and Long-run effects of a 5% increase in international exports. In % changes from 
base year. 
  Long-run   Short-run 
  FRW-FNW BRW ELS   FNW FRW BRW ELS 
GDP 2.08 0.95 0.23   0.64 0.30 0.19 - 
CPI - 0.75 1.24   0.92 1.09 1.24 1.40 
                  
Unemployment rate (pp difference) -1.80 -0.71 -   -0.98 -0.46 -0.29 - 
Total employment 1.91 0.75 -   1.04 0.49 0.31 - 
Nominal gross wage - 1.61 2.68   - 1.09 1.58 2.28 
Real gross wage - 0.86 1.43   -0.91 - 0.34 0.87 
                  
Households wealth 1.36 1.06 0.87   0.43 0.50 0.55 0.61 
Households consumption 1.46 1.16 0.96   0.70 0.56 0.75 0.83 
Labour income 1.91 2.38 2.69   1.04 1.58 1.90 2.28 
Capital income 2.35 1.99 1.76   3.84 2.97 2.83 2.43 
                  
Government budget -7.03 -2.42 0.59   -1.00 0.22 0.76 1.55 
Investment 2.35 1.28 0.59   3.35 2.46 2.01 1.36 
                  
Total energy use (intermediate+final) 2.53 1.72 1.21   1.30 1.04 1.03 0.93 
  - Electricity 2.03 1.26 0.77   1.16 0.83 0.81 0.68 
  - Gas 1.98 1.35 0.94   0.81 0.63 0.70 0.68 
Energy use in production (total intermediate) 2.36 1.41 0.80   0.79 0.55 0.52 0.42 
Energy consumption (total final demand) 2.91 2.44 2.15   1.56 1.49 1.59 1.64 
  - Households 1.43 1.30 1.21   0.75 0.68 0.92 1.05 
  - Investment 2.27 1.26 0.60   2.24 1.55 1.40 1.05 
  - Exports 5.00 4.11 3.53   2.66 2.63 2.55 2.49 
Energy output prices - 0.50 0.82   0.92 0.98 1.06 1.13 
Energy intensity (Total energy use/GDP) 0.44 0.76 0.98   0.66 0.74 0.84 - 
Territorial CO2 emissions 2.77 1.69 1.00  0.66 0.46 0.43 0.35 
Emission intensity (territorial CO2/GDP) 0.67 0.73 0.77  0.02 0.16 0.24 - 
         
Total imports 2.12 2.77 3.19   3.07 3.06 3.28 3.41 
Total exports 5.00 3.63 2.75   3.00 2.73 2.49 2.25 
Net exports (exports-imports) -0.19 -0.04 0.06   0.04 0.05 0.09 0.12 
  - Electricity 2.18 2.27 2.33   2.42 2.25 2.41 2.45 
  - Gas 2.29 2.46 2.58   2.68 2.53 2.70 2.77 
Note: Short- and long-run are two conceptual time periods. The short run (SR) is the period immediately after the introduction of the 
exogenous shock. Capital stocks are fixed in the SR at industry level. In the long run (LR) capital stocks fully adjust, across all sectors, 
to the shock, and are again equal to their desired levels. The short-run applies to a period of a year; the adjustment period to the 
long-run varies but is typically complete within 7-12 years. CO2 Emissions are calculated according to the method given in Allan et 
al. (2018). 
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The short- and long-run macroeconomic simulation results for a 5% increase in international 
exports, reported in percentage changes from base year, across the different labour market 
closures, are summarised in Table 1.  
The adjustments seen in the long-run for the FRW-FNW closures are akin to the results found in 
IO modelling. With no supply restrictions applying, prices remain unchanged in the long run 
(McGregor et al., 1996). The long-run results for the FRW and the FNW closures are the same as 
they both tie down wages in the long-run with no changes in prices.  
As there are no changes in prices (CPI remains unchanged from base), there is no crowding out 
of exports in the long run so that exports increase by the full 5%. The increase in exports 
stimulates aggregate demand, which increases consumption, investment, and GDP, by 1.46%, 
2.35% and 2.08% respectively. Capital stocks rise in the long run by 2.35%, with net investment 
driven by the gap between the capital rental rate and the user cost of capital that opens in the 
short run.  
The stimulus to investment and enhanced capacity reinforces the expansion (and the impact on 
employment). This expansion stimulates the demand for labour so that employment rises by 
1.91%, and the unemployment rate falls by 1.8 percentage points. Labour income and capital 
income both rise, by 1.91% and 2.35%, respectively. Export industries tend to be more capital 
intensive than the aggregate economy, so that the demand for capital increases slightly more 
than that for labour.  
The public sector deficit falls by 7.3% in the long run, a fall from £98bn to £91bn, as tax revenues 
rise in response to the stimulus to economic activity7. Imports increase by 2.12% along with 
increases in domestic demand. In the base period net exports are negative i.e. the UK economy 
imports more than it exports. The stimulus to exports thereby decreases the negative trade 
balance by 0.19%. 
When considering the BRW case, the stimulus to the real economy is significantly less (as 
compared to FRW/FNW) because real wages and prices rise in response to the excess demand 
for labour. So GDP in the BRW case increases by 0.95%, which is less than half of the 2.08% 
stimulus under FRW/FNW. The rise in the real and nominal wage pushes up the CPI (by 0.75%), 
reducing competitiveness and crowding out some of the stimulus to exports, which now rise by 
                                                                
7 We investigate the consequences of closing the Government budget constraint in the sensitivity analysis in Ross et al. (2018). 
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only 3.63% in the long run. The rise in consumption of 1.16% is less than under FRW (1.46%), 
but the decline is mitigated by the fact labour income actually rises more in this case, with the 
higher real wage more than offsetting the lower employment impact (0.75% as against 1.91%). 
Next we consider the ELS case of continuous full-employment. Employment is unchanged, but 
the real wage and the CPI rise by 1.43% and 1.24%, significantly more than under the BRW 
(0.86% and 0.75%). This results in much greater crowding out of exports, which now only rise 
by 2.75%, and a much bigger stimulus to imports (of 3.19%). The sectoral distribution of effects 
does result in a modest stimulus to GDP of 0.23%, but this is significantly less than under the 
BRW and FRW-FNW closures.  
The short-run impacts are muted given that the capital stock is fixed in the short run both in total 
and in its distribution across sectors, and prices increase in all cases so that there is some 
induced loss in competitiveness, and exports are always crowded out to a degree. As 
anticipated, the GDP (and employment) effects in the short run are ranked as: 
FNW>FRW>BRW>ELS (and indeed the impact is zero in this case). 
These results therefore appear reassuring for the conduct of UK industrial strategy in that key 
economic indicators move in the desired direction as a consequence of a successful export 
promotion strategy. However, there are substantial impacts on the energy system, which we now 
discuss. We focus on the BRW case, our preferred model. 
Energy use increases across the board in response to the export stimulus. Furthermore, energy 
use increases significantly relative to GDP, employment and investment. Energy intensity, 
defined here as energy use per unit of GDP, increases. In fact, this is true across all labour market 
models: energy intensity increases significantly as a consequence of a successful export 
promotion strategy. It appears that exports are thereby rather energy intensive. This is a 
potentially important spillover from a successful UK industrial strategy to the energy system.   
Energy output prices increase by 0.5% reflecting the stimulus to energy demand created by the 
expansion, as well the increase in labour and material costs.  
Figures 1 and 2 summarise selected long-run results at the individual sector level for the 5% 
increase in international exports, for the BRW. Although we do not discuss these sectoral results 
in more detail here (see Ross et al., (2018) for a detailed discussion), it is evident that aggregate 
energy impacts are driven by key characteristics of individual sectors. Although all sectors 
receive the same percentage export demand shock, sectoral impacts vary significantly because 
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of their heterogeneous nature. This highlights potential policy trade-offs, particularly at the 
individual sector level. Increasing exports may generate inadvertent, negative impacts on energy 
policy goals, if the impacted sectors are also energy intensive. 
Given that real wages (and capital incomes) are rising, households experience rising incomes 
and wealth and so their total consumption - of energy and non-energy goods & services  
increases, as we have already noted. Figure 6 summarises the long-run impacts on households 
consumption, income, the share of income spent on Electricity & Gas, and non-energy goods & 
services, across household quintiles, where HH1 is the lowest income quintile. The share of 
income spent on energy- and non-energy goods and services increases across all Household 
quintile groups.  
The time path adjustments for GDP, employment, and total energy use are detailed in Figure 4. 
This figure shows how these variables increase throughout all of the simulation periods. 
Moreover, these results highlight that total energy use increases more than proportionately to 
GDP, so that there is a significant negative spillover effect from successful export promotion 
policies to the energy system. 
 
Figure 1: Long-run effects on output, employment, and energy use by individual sectors of a 5% 
increase in international exports, BRW closure. In % changes from base year. 
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Figure 2: Long-run effects on output price, imports and exports at individual sectors of a 5% 
increase in international exports, BRW closure. In % changes from base year. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Long-run effects on Household quintiles of a 5% increase in international exports, BRW 
closure. In % changes from base year. 
 
 
 
 
Economic Commentary, September 2018   64 
 
Figure 4 Aggregate transition path for GDP, employment, and total energy use of a 5% increase 
in international exports. In % changes from base year.  
 
 
 
4. Summary & conclusions 
The wider impacts of energy policy on the macro-economy are increasingly recognised in 
academic and policy discussions around the appropriate use of energy policy. For example, 
recent analyses on energy efficiency policies emphasise the stimulus to economic activity that 
these typically generate and their potentially beneficial impacts on distributional issues. 
However, the potential impact of economic policies on the energy system have been 
comparatively neglected and, in particular there has been no system-wide analysis of the 
spillover effects from economic policies to the energy system (Cox et al., 2016). Neglect of such 
spillovers in policy formulation may lead to inefficiencies and unforeseen conflicts (or 
complementarities) between energy and economic policy goals. This could be avoided by a more 
holistic perspective.  
We begin by analysing the potential impacts of a successful UK industrial, business and 
innovation policy on the UK analyse the system-wide effects of successful export promotion 
policies on the energy system. However, since the energy system impacts of such policies are, 
in large part, transmitted via their impact on the economic system, it is necessary to adopt an 
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approach that fully captures such interdependence. We do so by employing a UK computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) model, UK-ENVI. 
At one level the results of our analysis may be regarded as re-assuring from the perspective of 
successful UK export promotion policies in that all the major indicators of UK economic activity, 
including GDP, employment, consumption and investment are typically significantly stimulated. 
So the major objectives of UK industrial policy are positively impacted by export promotion. 
However, there are significant, and typically negative spillover effects to the energy system. 
Most notably, UK exports are, on average, energy intensive, so that export-driven expansion is 
associated with a greater stimulus to total energy use than to GDP: hence the energy intensity of 
economic activity increases as a result. Furthermore, while not modelled here explicitly, this 
result could translate into increased CO2 emissions if action is not taken at the same time to 
decarbonise the economy in line with the Industrial Strategy challenge on Clean Growth. 
General, across-the-board, export-driven growth is typically not green in nature. However, it 
may be possible to target such policies at specific sectors so as to stimulate green growth.  
Although we do not attempt to investigate the impacts on precise measures of fuel poverty (or 
poverty in general) we can identify the impact on the share of household disposable income 
spent on energy and non-energy goods across income quintiles. Our results suggest that the 
proportion of the lowest household income groups spending on energy increases and so on that 
basis fuel poverty increases. On the other hand, however, that groups total income and total 
expenditure on all goods also increase. Other goals of energy policy are similarly adversely 
affected: affordability (as indicated by an increase in the price of energy) declines, although real 
incomes actually increase by more than energy prices so that the real price of energy and 
hence affordability is improved.  
Energy security is a complex issue with a wide range of indicators (e.g. UK Energy Research 
Centre, 2018). Here we report that the ratio of imported energy to GDP increases. Some would 
interpret this as a deterioration in security of supply, although that is controversial and imports 
can and have been used to augment security (e.g. during the miners strike). Given this we 
conclude that the impact of export promotion on security of supply is ambiguous (and will vary 
depending on the source of imports, supply routes and the mix of sources and fuels). As noted 
above, fuel poverty and affordability can also be included within the energy security framework. 
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Overall, it is very clear that, while successful export growth strategies are likely to have the 
desired effect on the economy and the stated goals of industrial policy, they could have 
significant negative spillover effects on the energy system and energy policy goals. Neglecting 
these spillover effects creates a source of inefficiency in the conduct of policy, and a knowledge 
of their likely scale could be used to develop a more holistic, coordinated approach to policy 
formation and implementation. For example, pursuit of the Clean Growth Strategy could 
mitigate/offset any increase in emissions that would otherwise result from an export promotion 
policy. This would minimise the prospect of conflicts between UK industrial and green growth 
strategies. 
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